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Abstract 
Organizational innovations are essential for firms’ long-term competitiveness. In spite of this, 
there is less research on organizational innovations than on technical innovations. The 
purpose of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of how organizational innovations 
are created, diffused, and sustained. 
The journey started by exploring the creation and diffusion of organizational innovations 
through a literature-review-based article and an empirical study on the organizational 
innovation ‘TQM’. The journey continued with an empirical study elaborating upon the role 
of the board in sustaining the organizational innovations ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’. In each 
empirical study, data were collected through interviews, supplemented by secondary data. The 
three concepts ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’ and ‘sustainability’ of organizational innovations were 
found to be three intertwined concepts, rather than three separate and sequential ones. One 
reason was that organizational innovations were constantly re-invented through the processes 
of creation, diffusion, and sustainability. In this context, the concept ‘Sustainability’ refers to 
an improvement trajectory, rather than to a particular organizational innovation. The 
improvement trajectory is path-dependent and directs the creation, diffusion and sustainability 
of organizational innovations to and within a firm. Due to this complexity, a question was 
raised about how the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations can 
be understood and conceptualized (RQ1). The answer is a conceptual model that integrates 
the three concepts ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’ and ‘sustainability’ in a five-step process, circling 
around a firm-specific improvement trajectory. The five steps are: ‘Desirability’, ‘Feasibility’, 
‘First-Trial’, ‘Implementation’ and ‘Sustainability’. Each step is affected by three sets of 
influencing factors: the external context and interpersonal diffusion channels, the firm-
specific internal context, and the characteristics of the innovation itself.  
To find out how the characteristics of organizational innovations affect the applicability of the 
conceptualization (RQ2), the conceptual model was tested on a different organizational 
innovation ‘Google’, identified in an empirical study conducted at Google, known for its 
focus on continuous innovation. The test showed that the conceptual model was valid also for 
‘Google’ and was useful in identifying both similarities and differences in the creation, 
diffusion, and sustainability of ‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’ on one side and ‘Google’ on the other.  
 
Keywords: innovation, organizational innovation, diffusion of innovation, creation of 
innovation, sustaining innovation, innovation management, TQM, Toyota Production System, 
Lean, Google. 
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Organizational Innovations: A conceptualization of 
how they are created, diffused and sustained 
1 Introduction 
Researchers from different disciplines and with different perspectives during the past half-
century have explored innovation (Birkinshaw et al. 2008). As a result, a fragmented research 
portfolio on innovation has been developed (Fagerberg, Oxford Handbook of Innovation, 
2005). Most of this research has focused on technical innovations, while research on 
organizational innovations has been conducted to a lesser extent (Birkinshaw et al. 2008). 
Organizational innovation is here defined as new organizational methods in a firm’s business 
practices, workplace organization or external relations (OECD, 2007). 
Organizational innovations are typically implemented in order to increase operational 
efficiency, employee satisfaction or a firm’s innovativeness. Today there are several examples 
of organizational innovations, such as Divisionalization (‘M-form’), Total Quality 
Management (‘TQM’), Toyota Production System (‘TPS’), ‘Lean Production’ (‘Lean’), and 
Balance Scorecard that have led to competitive advantages for the firms that embraced the 
innovations (Womack & Jones, 2003; Liker 2004; Birkinshaw et al. 2008). Further, 
organizational innovations are usually necessary for technical innovations (Freeman, 1982; 
Leonard-Barton, 1988; Teece, 2007; Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1997). In spite of the fact that 
organizational innovations create long-term competitive advantages and are important for 
technical innovations, they “…remain poorly managed and poorly understood” (Birkinshaw 
& Mol, 2006). Especially the processes through which organizational innovations are created 
and sustained are relatively under-researched (Birkinshaw et al. 2008; Buchanan et al. 2005).  
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is, from a firm-level perspective, to contribute to our understanding 
of how organizational innovations are created, diffused, and sustained. 
 
The main concepts studied in this thesis are the ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’, and ‘sustainability’ of 
organizational innovations. An analytical framework for the diffusion2 of organizational 
innovations is therefore developed in Paper I. The analytical framework is then tested on the 
major organizational innovation3 ‘TQM’ in Paper II. The roles of boards in sustaining three 
major organizational innovations ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’ are explored in Paper III, and 
finally the characteristics and the creation, diffusion and sustainability of a fourth major 
organizational innovation, ‘Google’, are investigated in Paper IV. The aim in this “kappa” is 
twofold: to conceptualize the findings in Papers I, II and III into one conceptual model and to 
test this model on the major organizational innovation in Paper IV. Thereby the purpose of 
                                                 
2In Paper I, the organizational innovation was found hard to separate from its diffusion.  
3Major Organizational Innovation (MOI) is defined in the chapter ‘Theoretical Framework’. 
 2 
 
better understanding how organizational innovations are created, diffused and sustained can 
be fulfilled. 
1.2 Historical outline of research 
The thesis is the result of a learning process that stretches over 18 years, including a 10-year 
intermission in the private sector, working with business development in mobile 
telecommunication and professional services.  
In this section, the outline of the research process will be presented in a chronological order, 
that is, the order in which the different research studies were conducted. The chronological 
order starts with exploring the diffusion of organizational innovations, goes through the role 
of a board in sustaining organizational innovations, and ends with examining the 
characteristics of the organization of an innovative firm in the Internet industry and how it 
was created, diffused, and sustained.  
The first step in this research and learning process was to conduct a literature review of the 
diffusion of technical and organizational innovations to firms. The literature review revealed 
that research has been primarily focused on the diffusion of technical innovations and the 
diffusion of organizational innovations has been less studied. The question was therefore 
whether understanding of the diffusion of technical innovations could contribute to an 
analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. A comparison 
of intrinsic features of technical and organizational innovations showed that insights from 
previous research literature on the diffusion of technical innovations could be re-used when 
building an analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. 
However, there are some implications due to the different nature of organizational innovations 
and their diffusion4 that need to be considered. One implication is that the analytical 
framework needs to cover both the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of organizational 
innovations (Paper I).  
The analytical framework developed in Paper I was then tested and validated in Paper II. Two 
Swedish empirical studies were conducted on one manufacturing firm (Electrolux Storkök 
AB) and on one service provider (Mölndal Hospital). Suggestions for further development of 
the analytical framework were presented. An observation in Paper II was that major 
organizational innovations need considerable time to be implemented fully. Therefore a 
deeply committed CEO was crucial. However, a committed top management does not last 
forever, and a need for a “higher level of influencers” such as owners and the board was 
identified.  
Hence, in Paper III, the focus was on understanding the role of boards in sustaining major 
organizational innovations. Three case studies were conducted: one on the service provider 
Mölndal Hospital and two on the manufacturing firms Fagersta Stainless AB and Scania AB. 
                                                 
4Compared to the nature of technical innovations and their diffusion. 
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The common issue between the three cases was that they all had implemented organizational 
innovations such as ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, or ‘Lean’. 
Papers I, II and III together resulted in an understanding of how organizational innovations 
diffuse to and within a firm and what role a board plays in sustaining an organizational 
innovation.  
In Paper IV, the purpose was to explore organizational characteristics for continuous 
innovation in rapidly changing industries. The paper is based on literature reviews and an 
empirical study conducted at Google Inc. The empirical study identified the main 
organizational characteristics behind Google’s innovativeness but also provided data on how 
this organizational innovation had been created, diffused5 and sustained over time. The 
empirical study behind Paper IV thereby contributed to this “kappa” with data that could be 
used in testing a conceptualization of the findings in Papers I, II and III, which all are based 
on empirical studies of innovations such as ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’. 
In summary, the different papers in this thesis are all focused on organizational innovations. 
Four organizational innovations – ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, ‘Lean’, and ‘Google’ – have been used in 
order to study one or several of the concepts ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’, and/or ‘sustainability’ of 
organizational innovations. The first paper developed an analytical framework for studying 
the diffusion of organizational innovations. The second paper tested the analytical framework 
in an empirical study on the organizational innovation ‘TQM’. The third paper examined, in 
an empirical study, what roles a board plays in order to sustain innovations such as ‘TQM’, 
‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’. Finally, the fourth paper investigated, in an empirical study, the 
characteristics of, as well as the creation, diffusion and sustainability of, a slightly different 
organizational innovation, ‘Google’. ‘Google’ is used in this “kappa” for testing the 
conceptualization6 of the findings in Papers I, II and III. 
1.3 Research questions 
Building upon the work represented in the appended papers, this “kappa” explores the 
following two research questions: 
1. How can the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations be 
understood and conceptualized?  
2. How do the characteristics of organizational innovations affect the applicability of the 
conceptualization?  
The thesis contributes to previous research by providing additional understanding of how 
organizational innovations are created, diffused and sustained.  
                                                 
5The diffusion process was studied by exploring which of the organizational ideas in the current organization 
came from the outside that is had been diffused to the firm. 
6The conceptualization is mainly built on findings from ‘TQM’ studies, and to a lesser degree on findings from 
studies on ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’. 
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In short, the main contributions from the papers are the following:  
1. Interrelating theories on the diffusion of technical innovations with the diffusion of 
organizational innovations (Paper I). 
2. Developing and empirically testing an analytical framework for studying the diffusion 
of organizational innovations (Papers I and II). 
3. Identifying the board’s roles in sustaining major organizational innovations (Paper 
III). 
4. Investigating the organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in rapidly 
changing industries and providing data on how a highly innovative organization in the 
Internet industry was created, diffused, and has been sustained (Paper IV). 
 
The main contributions from this “kappa” are: 
1. A conceptualization7 of how organizational innovations are created, diffused, and 
sustained. 
2. A test on how characteristics of an organizational innovation affect the applicability of 
the conceptualization. 
The thesis includes the “kappa” and the four appended papers, of which three are published 
(Papers I, II, and III) and one is submitted for publication (Paper IV). The succeeding chapters 
in this “kappa” focus on: theoretical framework, methodology, summary of appended papers, 
discussion, conclusion and suggestions for future research.  
  
                                                 
7Each of Papers I, II and III has focused on one primary concept (the exceptions were Paper I and Paper II, in 
which the main focus was the ‘diffusion’ of organizational innovation, but where the ‘innovation’ and its 
‘diffusion’ were viewed as two issues that were hard to separate). This means that no previous integration of the 
concepts ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’, and ‘sustainability’ has been made in the first three papers. The 
conceptualization conducted in this “kappa” therefore aims for integrating the findings in Papers I, II and III into 
one integrated and visualized model. The conceptual model is then tested on the organizational characteristics of 
‘Google’, presented in Paper IV.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
In spite of the fact that organizational innovations have been found important for firms’ long-
term competitive advantages, the creation and diffusion of organizational innovations are two 
areas where comparatively limited research has been conducted (Edquist, 1992; Birkinshaw et 
al. 2008). Further, how to sustain an implemented organizational innovation has so far also 
been little researched and there is no established research tradition in this area (Buchanan et 
al. 2005). 
In order to better understand how organizational innovations are created, diffused and 
sustained, this theoretical framework consists of two main sections. First, organizational 
innovations as such will be defined and explored. Second, previous research found in regard 
to how organizational innovations are created, diffused and sustained will be presented. 
2.1 Organizational innovations 
An organizational innovation8 is defined according to OECD (2007) as “…a new 
organizational method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external 
relations. Organizational innovations can be intended to increase a firm’s performance by 
reducing administrative costs or transaction costs, improving workplace satisfaction (and 
thus labour productivity), gaining access to non-tradable assets (such as non-codified 
external knowledge) or reducing cost of supplies.” With “business practices” we here include 
organizational elements such as leadership, culture, human resource management, 
management processes including business development, performance and incentive systems 
and mechanisms for learning, and external and internal corporate communication. Further, an 
organizational innovation could, in this thesis, also be intended to improve a firm’s 
innovativeness.  
Organizational innovation can refer to either ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ or ‘new-to-the- 
firm’ (Mol & Birkinshaw, 2009). In this thesis the primary criterion used of these two is 
‘new-to-the-firm’, as this could be assumed to be the most frequent case. This would mean 
that organizational innovations could be a result of existing diffused organizational ideas9, but 
also of a more local process of inventions in a specific context (e.g. within a specific firm). 
The latter case could mean that the organizational innovation is not only ‘new-to-the-firm’ but 
potentially also ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ (if the firm is the original inventor of the 
organizational innovation) 10. Moreover, if a consulting firm, university or standardization 
                                                 
8In this thesis the concepts of organizational, administrative and managerial innovations are used 
interchangeably. 
9Diffused e.g. within a local institutional set-up, through “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973) or between sub-units 
within the same corporate group. An organizational innovation is here assumed to be, most frequently, a result of 
a new combination of existing diffused ideas or a combination of existing and new ideas (Schumpeter, 1934). 
10The standardization and communication of the new innovation could then be conducted by e.g. the firm itself, 
by a university or by a consulting firm (Book, 2006). 
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institute is creating and/or standardizing11 an organizational innovation of a firm, or a 
combination of different organizational ideas from several firms, and then communicates this 
organizational innovation, the organizational innovation could be new to firms but could 
potentially also be ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’. Later in this chapter we will see that 
organizational innovations are constantly re-invented, also after they have been first trialed 
and implemented. This makes the distinction between ‘new-to-the-firm’ and ‘new-to-the-
state-of-the-art’ even harder, as the implemented innovation through a later re-invention could 
suddenly be not only slightly ‘new to-the-firm’ but also ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’. 
However, as seen in the examples above, the criterion ‘new-to-the-firm’ is probably more 
frequently fulfilled than ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’. Further, since an organizational 
innovation is hard to protect by a patent, it is also hard to evaluate whether the organizational 
innovation is truly ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’. Instead it will be a question of translating, 
packaging, labeling and communicating an organizational innovation as ‘new-to-the-state-of-
art’. The property right then lies in the translation/packaging/labeling of the innovation rather 
than in a patent. 
 
As a result, an organizational innovation is here defined as an organizational method in a 
firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external relations that is new to the firm 
and intended to improve the firm’s performance.  
Organizational innovations can be more or less complex. Some affect a certain business 
process (e.g. re-engineering of the purchasing process), while others affect every single part 
of an organization. According to Hamel (2006, p. 74), an organizational innovation creates 
long-term competitive advantages if it meets one or more of three conditions: “The innovation 
is based on a novel principle that challenges management orthodoxy; it is systematic, 
encompassing a range of processes and methods; and it is part of an ongoing program of 
invention, where progress compounds over time”. This would mean that the organizational 
innovation needs a certain degree of ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ and/or corporate coverage in 
order to create competitive advantages long-term. Further, the organizational innovation is 
preferably part of a larger program of inventions12. An example of this kind of organizational 
innovation is Total Quality Management (TQM). TQM is built on a strong belief in the 
problem-solving capacity of employees, so the innovation introduced a high focus on the 
empowerment of employees. This “mental model” was quite different from the Tayloristic 
view where employees were to follow instructions and do repetitive tasks designed by 
specialists (Hamel, 2006). Further, it is an innovation that involves several parts of the 
organization, which together create the success of a firm. Finally, it is built up by sub-
innovations such as Kaizen13, Policy Deployment14 Quality Circles15, and can therefore be seen 
                                                 
11By standardizing we mean translation, packaging/description, and labeling of an organizational innovation. 
One reason behind the standardization, specifically on a national/international level, is to be able to communicate 
and therefore diffuse the organizational innovation. 
12
 Later in the section ‘How to sustain organizational innovations’ we will talk about an ‘improvement trajectory’ 
that could be viewed as a ‘program of inventions’. 
13
‘Kaizen’, Japanese for improvement or change for the better, refers to philosophy and practices that focus upon 
continuous improvement of organizational processes (Shiba et al. 1993). 
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as an ongoing program of inventions, which increases a firm’s performance over time. In this 
thesis, this kind of systematic organizational innovations based on a novel principle and 
progressing over time, will be called Major Organizational Innovations (MOI). 
2.1.1 Characterization of some Major Organizational Innovations  
Major Organizational Innovations (MOIs) exist in many forms. Organizational innovations 
such as: Divisionalization (‘M-form’), Toyota Production System (‘TPS’) and Total Quality 
Management (‘TQM’), mentioned by Birkinshaw et al. (2008), could be viewed as MOIs 
since they seem to fulfill the requirements of being based on a novel management principle, 
being systematic, and being part of an ongoing program of inventions aiming for increasing 
progress over time. For the same reasons, ‘Lean Production’ (‘Lean’) could be added to the 
list of MOIs. This would mean that the empirically studied organizational innovations ‘TQM’ 
in Paper II and ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’ in Paper III could all be regarded as ‘Major 
Organizational Innovations’16.  
As previous research has emphasized the need to clearly define an organizational innovation 
in order to study it (Alänge et al. 1998), the three major organizational innovations used in 
Papers II and III will be characterized below with the support of a selection17 of past research.  
As ‘TQM’ (early 1990s version), ‘TPS’ (early 2000s version), and ‘Lean’ (early 2000s 
version) are three MOIs that all are based on the “Toyota Way” and therefore are closely 
related, they will from now on be categorized into one category: ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. They 
are all characterized by a higher degree of standardization, known for their focus on quality 
and operational efficiency, and originally developed mainly in the automobile industry18. 
‘TQM’, based on the Japanese organizational innovation ‘TQC’ and practices from Toyota, 
was characterized in Alänge (1994) by customer focus, visible leadership, total approach, 
process focus, continuous learning and standardization for creativity. TQM has since the 
1990s been further developed but is still valid. For example, parts of the organizational 
                                                                                                                                                        
14
 ‘Policy Deployment’ is a strategic planning/ strategic management methodology. It is devised to capture and 
cement strategic goals as well as flashes of insight about the future and develop the means to bring these into 
reality (Shiba et al. 1993). 
15
 A ‘quality circle’ is a volunteer group composed of workers, usually under the leadership of their supervisor 
(although they can elect a team leader), who are trained to identify, analyze and solve work-related problems and 
present their solutions to management in order to improve the performance of the organization, and motivate and 
enrich the work of employees. When matured, true quality circles become self-managing, having gained the 
confidence of management (Shiba et al. 1993).  
16
 Our assumption is that our findings on the creation, diffusion and sustainability of a MOI are valid also for less 
complex organizational innovations such as a re-engineering of a single process. 
17
 The referred literature in the case of ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’ should be seen as a good and well-known 
example of how each major organizational innovation was defined around the time it was studied. We are well 
aware that there exists much literature on each of the three MOIs and that the definition of each partly differs 
over time and within this body of literature. 
18
 All three innovations have been further developed, so it is important to understand which “version” was used 
in the empirical studies. For example, MBNQA has described ‘TQM’ 2011/2012 with a number of new criteria, 
e.g. agility and managing for innovation, which could indicate that industries overall have become more dynamic 
and that the overall demand on companies to be innovative has increased.  
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innovation such as customer focus, visible leadership, total approach and continuous learning 
are still valid. However, ‘TQM’ in 2011 (MBNQA, 2011/2012) also emphasizes innovation 
and agility, which were not explicitly emphasized in the 1990s versions.   
Similarly, ‘TPS’ (Liker, 2004) and ‘Lean’ (Womack & Jones, 2003), based on practices from 
Toyota, have been standardized into organizational innovations that are possible to diffuse in 
a powerful way to both large and small manufacturing firms. As a result of this 
standardization of ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’, there is today basically one dominant paradigm in the 
automobile industry on how to produce cars and it is possible to find considerable agreement 
on the meaning of the two major organizational innovations. This category of well-
standardized major organizational innovations (the 1990s version of ‘TQM’ and the early 
2000s version of ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’), known for their focus on quality and operational 
efficiency, has been used in order to test the analytical framework for the diffusion of 
organizational innovations in Paper II and to explore the role of boards in sustaining major 
organizational innovations in Paper III. 
‘Google’, studied in Paper IV, could be assumed to also be a MOI. The reason for this is that 
Google in recent years has been branded as a unique company with an innovative 
organization. Titles such as “The Google Way: How One Company Is Revolutionizing 
Management As We Know It” (Girard, 2009) and “Googled: The End of the World as We 
Know It” (Auletta, 2009) have supported the picture of ‘Google’ as a major organizational 
innovation. 
Further, this MOI could be assumed to be different from the category ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. 
The reason is that ‘Google’ has developed in the much younger, software-based19 Internet 
industry (here called the Internet Service industry). Further, it is not standardized and it is 
primarily focused on continuous innovation, rather than on quality and operational efficiency.  
In order to explore whether ‘Google’ could be viewed as another kind of MOI, a presentation 
of organizational characteristics needed for continuous innovation in industries related to that 
of the Internet Service industry20 is made below. In addition to exploring organizational 
characteristics for continuous innovation in rapidly changing, Internet Service- related 
industries the body of literature is from the same time period as that in which the major 
organizational innovation, ‘Google’, was created. This was not a criterion when the literature 
was selected, but rather an interesting observation after we had selected the literature, around 
                                                 
19A distinction is made between the software-based and hardware-based Internet industry. Software can be 
assumed to have shorter development cycles than hardware. One reason for this is the faster process for testing 
software over the Internet on a large enough number of “users”. 
20
 Here defined as industries producing mainly software with a relatively short development cycle (< 6-12 
months) and market life cycle (< 6-12 months). An important note is that in these rapidly changing industries, a 
potential monopolistic position (as some would call Google’s position) is only temporarily possible. Further, a 
product such as ‘Adwords’ is not ONE product but rather a product that is continuously innovated in order to 
keep a market-leading position. Each sub-component of the product therefore needs to be re-invented frequently. 
Further, the product has been expanded to new channels such as e.g. Mobile, Social, and Television, which have 
demanded more radical innovations. 
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which later research has been clustered. The fact that the literature is from the time period 
when ‘Google’ was created, and conducted, by researchers who in several cases were living 
and working in Silicon Valley, might also provide some context21 from which this MOI could 
have been inspired22. If later in the ‘Discussion’ it is found that there is a good match between 
the findings in this body of literature and ‘Google’, it will tell us primarily two things: in what 
degree ‘Google’ is a unique MOI, and whether a MOI like ‘Google’ was created through 
inspiration from outside (through a diffusion process) or through a local isolated innovation 
process. Further, by identifying the characteristics of ‘Google’ and matching these with 
identified characteristics from other rapidly changing industries, we would have an indication 
of whether the characteristics of ‘Google’ are relevant also for companies in other rapidly 
changing industries, and whether these characteristics are different enough from the 
characteristics of ‘TQM’/ ‘TPS’/’Lean’ in order for a potential test of the conceptual model to 
be meaningful.  
2.1.1.1 Examples of key characteristics23 for long-term competitiveness 
Researchers from different disciplines (e.g. Teece & Pisano, 1994; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997 
& 1998; Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1997; Chesbrough, 2003) have explicitly or implicitly 
explored organizational characteristics for long-term competitiveness in industries such as 
Information Services, Semiconductors, and Telecommunication services, that is, primarily 
software-based industries that all are rapidly changing. The selected researchers found that 
organizations in these industries need to be: adaptable and constantly renewable, support both 
innovations and operational excellence (be ambidextrous), and effectively tap opportunities in 
the external environment by being open.  
2.1.1.1.1 Adaptability and renewal 
Winners in the global market24 have, according to Teece and Pisano (1994), been firms that 
can demonstrate timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled 
with the management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external 
competences. Teece and Pisano (1994) refer to this source of competitive advantage as 
dynamic capabilities. Zollo and Winter (2002) found that these capabilities are originated 
from a learned and stable pattern of collective activities, and that firms differ in their dynamic 
capabilities partly because they implicitly or explicitly emphasize differently the strategic 
importance of change in the future. Zollo and Winter (2002) also argued, as did Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000), that firms’ dynamic capabilities differ because they are in environments 
                                                 
21Theories of what were required for long-term competitiveness in rapidly changing, software-based industries in 
the time period 1996-2005. In addition, several of the theoretical ideas were “created” in a “Silicon Valley” 
context, the home turf of Google.  
22We are well aware that Google might not have been inspired from the literature directly but by discussions 
going on at that time in Silicon Valley. 
23The characteristics explored in this section are key characteristics identified in selected research literature 
focused on “what is demanded for long-term competitiveness in rapidly changing industries”, rather than aiming 
to be theoretically comprehensive.  
24Referring to companies in industries such as semiconductors, information services and telecom services. 
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with different rates of change. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argued that, depending on the 
velocity of the market the dynamic capabilities vary from being detailed, analytical and stable 
processes with predictable outcomes to simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with 
unpredicted outcomes.  
Dynamic capabilities are important to consider in order for a firm to reconfigure and renew its 
organization. Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 1998) found that firms25 present in high-velocity 
industries needed to manage the demand for continual renewal, so they examined the aspect 
of “renewal” of firms further by using complexity and evolutionary theories as well as 
literature exploring the fundamental nature of change and evolution. As a result they 
developed a number of new concepts that all created a higher flexibility for a firm to adapt 
and re-configure as a result of external changes.  
Their first concept, ‘edge of chaos’, meant that firms should be only partly structured, and 
was built upon the intuition that “change occurs when strategies and their related 
organizations are sufficiently rigid so that change can be organized to happen but not so rigid 
that it cannot occur.” The concept captures the complicated, uncontrolled, unpredictable, yet 
adaptive behavior – self-organization – that occurs when there is some structure but not too 
much. So the critical management issue is to figure out both what to structure and what not to 
structure. The concept ‘edge of chaos’ consists of two building blocs: first, improvisation 
inside the organization, where the managers rely on a few key rules to innovate adaptively, 
while simultaneously and consistently executing products on time, on target and on budget. 
Key components are an adaptive culture in which people expect to change as conditions shift, 
a semi-structured organization that tracks a few important outcomes, deadlines and priorities 
but keeps much of the activity unstructured, and ad hoc, flowing, real-time communication 
focused on concrete operating information, including formal and informal, internal and 
external communication. Second, in order to capture synergies in the management of multiple 
businesses within the same firm, co-adaptation was found important.  
The second concept is the ‘edge of time’, which indicates that change requires thinking 
simultaneously about multiple time horizons: past, current and future. The critical 
management issue is how to manage all timeframes simultaneously without being trapped in 
any one. This concept also includes two building blocs that focus on tomorrow’s businesses. 
First, regeneration that looks into how managers can utilize the past in order to gain 
advantages. Second, experimentation, which shows how managers can experiment with a 
wide variety of low- cost probes into the future to gain insight and strategic flexibility. 
Options and learning are central components, and constant but thin management is seen as a 
virtue.  
The third concept, ‘time pacing’ means that change is triggered by passage of time rather than 
by occurrence of events. The key management issue is then to pick the right rhythm and to 
choreograph transitions, e.g. from product generation to product generation.  
                                                 
25
 Referring to companies in the computer industry. 
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Finally, the authors describe three leadership roles important for the renewal of the 
organization. The first role is that of the key strategist on business unit level, who is in need of 
juggling skills to deal with competing tensions. Second, a patching role on middle level, 
where the focus is on constantly realigning businesses to match continually shifting business 
opportunities – using modularity and patching. Patching involves two issues:  size and 
content. The “patcher” needs pattern recognition skills. Third, a synthesizer of strategy is 
needed on a senior level, which articulates the semi-coherent pattern of strategies. This 
synthesizer needs to develop pattern synthesis and articulation skills. 
2.1.1.1.2 Ambidextrous organization 
A firm’s ability to compete over time is rooted in its ability to be simultaneously efficient and 
innovative (Benner & Tushman, 2003). Further, according to Teece (2007, p. 51): “The need 
for both exploration and exploitation is well accepted for adaptive systems.” According to 
Benner and Tushman (2003), ambidextrous organizational forms provide the contexts for both 
exploitative and exploratory activities to coexist. Ambidextrous organizations, and how best 
to manage the tension between exploitation and exploration, have therefore received attention 
among researchers within the areas of organization. Much of this research is inspired by 
March’s (1991) article on learning and the need of, but difficulty in pursuing, both exploration 
and exploitation strategies.  
Among scholars within this area, two main philosophies can be identified26. The first is that 
both explorative and exploitative activities can be managed in parallel in the same 
organization (Grove, 1996; Markides, 1998, Burgelman, 2002; Magnusson & Martini, 2008; 
Lawson and Samson, 2001). The second is that the two kinds of activities cannot be in the 
same organization but must be more or less separated (Teece, 2007; Kanter, 1989; O’Connor, 
2008). 
Tushman and O’Reilly III (1997) argued as well for the importance of simultaneously 
supporting both the ongoing operations that generate revenue and the new areas that might 
generate value for the future. They maintain that companies need innovation streams that run 
counter to forces for organizational inertia. According to them, managers need to create 
ambidextrous organizations that can celebrate stability and incremental change 
simultaneously with experimentation and discontinuous change. According to Stacey (1992, 
p.19), “Successful organizations – that is, continually innovative organizations – cannot 
choose between tight, formal control systems and structures on the one hand and loose, 
informal processes that provoke learning on the other… they…must have both at the same 
time”. This in turn requires, however, managers who can simultaneously handle several 
inconsistent organizational architectures and cultures and who can build ambidextrous 
organizations (Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1997).  
                                                 
26
 One way of managing the tension between explorative and exploitative activities is to rely on “skunk works”. 
However, this form of solution is not included in this section as it is viewed here more or less as a proof of 
unresolved tension between the two sets of activities. 
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2.1.1.1.3 Openness 
A firm and its organization can be more or less open towards interaction with the external 
environment. If a firm is viewed as a system, system theories conclude that a closed system 
exhibits clear boundaries and is subject to entropy, moving toward disorganization or chaos 
until it fails, while an open system has semi-permeable boundaries that escape entropy by 
feeding on a continual flux of energy and matter to stay alive (O’Connor, 2008). In other 
words, if a firm is viewed as a system it must be open in order to survive long-term.  
The idea of an open organization became increasingly popular when Chesbrough27 in 2003 
launched the concept “Open Innovation”. According to Chesbrough (2003) there are a number 
of reasons why companies today need to become “open”. First, there are new powerful ways 
to reach beyond the conventional boundaries of the firm and tap ideas from the external 
environment. Second, really smart people are not all working for the same company but are 
distributed all over the world in multiple institutions. Third, innovations in the interstices 
between different disciplines become more common. Fourth, the time to market becomes 
shorter and the products’ life cycles become shorter, so companies need to speed up their 
development processes.  
As a result, managers need to establish and manage external linkages to the surrounding 
environment. A high pace of technological change and a high intensity of competition might 
mean that firms to an increasing degree need to use these external linkages to complement 
their own internal capabilities with external capabilities. However, currently the theoretical 
guidance about how to design and manage these external linkages on a network level is 
relatively limited (Smart et al. 2007). 
According to Trott and Hartmann (2009), many scholars of R&D management and innovation 
management have discussed the issue of open organizations for innovation over the last 40 
years. The question can therefore be raised whether managers have ever viewed their own 
organizations as “closed” or whether this is only a concept used by researchers. More correct 
questions might instead be “in what degree the organization is open” and “how an 
organization can better utilize e.g. new technology and external networks in order to sustain 
its capability to constantly change, renew and innovate.  
2.1.2 Summary 
This section has not only defined organizational innovations but also presented three criteria, 
which if fulfilled could create long-term competitiveness for the inventing firm. 
Organizational innovations fulfilling one or more of these criteria were called Major 
Organizational Innovations, MOIs. The four empirically innovations studied in this thesis – 
‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, ‘Lean’ and ‘Google’ – could all be viewed as MOIs as they could be argued to 
fulfill one or more of the three criteria. However, while ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ were mainly 
developed in the automobile industry, are well standardized and are known for their focus on 
                                                 
27
 Chesbrough (2003) primarily studied companies in the previously mentioned rapidly changing industries. 
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quality and operational efficiency, the MOI, ‘Google’, was originally developed in the much 
younger Internet Service industry, is not standardized, and is known for its focus on 
continuous innovation rather than on quality and operational efficiency. In order to better 
understand whether ‘Google’ could be viewed as a potential MOI and a different MOI 
compared to ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, some key organizational characteristics for long-term 
competitiveness in Internet Service- related industries, such as Information Services, 
Semiconductors and Telecommunication Services, were presented. These key characteristics 
will be used in the ‘Discussion’ when discussing the characteristics of ‘Google’.  
The identified key characteristics were: adaptability and constant renewal, ambidextrous 
organizations, and openness. These three characteristics are different from the key 
characteristics in ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. For example, even if the three studied MOIs28 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ in some degree do emphasize openness29 they do not explicitly 
emphasize the importance of adaptability and constant renewal and of ambidextrous 
organizations. Instead the three MOIs emphasized issues such as process orientation and 
standardization30, issues that were not explicitly emphasized in the presented findings from 
Internet Service- related industries. Finally, the presented key characteristics needed for long-
term competitiveness in Internet Service- related industries were all from studies published in 
the same time period as when ‘Google’ was created. For this reason the literature might also 
provide some insights in regard to the context in which ‘Google’ was created. 
2.2 The creation and diffusion of organizational 
innovations  
Primarily four perspectives have been used when studying organizational innovations31 
(Birkinshaw et al. 2008, p. 827). These are the ‘Institutional perspective’ where institutional 
conditions influence the creation and diffusion of organizational innovations; the ‘Fashion 
perspective’ where “…fashion setters continuously redefine both their and fashion followers’ 
collective beliefs about which management techniques lead rational management progress”; 
the ‘Cultural perspective’ where the organization’s culture influences the creation and 
diffusion of organizational innovations; and finally the ‘Rational perspective’ where managers 
take on a role in creating and implementing organizational innovations. In addition to these 
four perspectives, a fifth perspective was used in Alänge et al. (1998). This is the perspective 
of Innovation systems32, which in turn is partly influenced by the Institutional perspective (e.g. 
Lundvall, 1992).  
                                                 
28
 We used the 1990s’ version of ‘TQM’ and early 2000s’ version of ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’. 
29
 However, openness in the world of ‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’ is according to us not the same as e.g. Open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). 
30
 The Japanese emphasized standardization in the 1990s (Shiba et al. 1993). However, the emphasis on 
“standardization for creativity” in Alänge (1994) was quite uncommon in the 1990s, even in Japan.  
31
 Birkinshaw et al. (2008) use the concept ‘management innovation’. We will here use it interchangeably with 
the concept ‘organizational innovation’. 
32
 Freeman coined the expression "National Innovation System" in his study of the success of the Japanese 
economy in 1987. The concept was later applied to regions and sectors. In an innovation system perspective, 
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As a result, the research community has according to Birkinshaw et al. (2008) used one of 
these different perspectives, or a mix of them (e.g Kimberly, 1979; Birkinshaw et al. 2008), 
when studying organizational innovations. This thesis is based on a mix of primarily two 
perspectives, the ‘Rational perspective’ (Birkinshaw et al. 2008) and the ‘Innovation systems’ 
perspective (Alänge et al. 1998). The main reason for this is that we believe that managers 
take on a leading and rational role in the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of an 
organizational innovation and that the innovation systems perspective is useful when to better 
understand the three concepts, specifically so if the ‘Innovation systems’ perspective (most 
commonly focused on inter-firm diffusion of innovations) is complemented with literature 
dealing with intra-firm diffusion and change management in general (Alänge et al. 1998).  
2.2.1 The creation of organizational innovations 
Attempts have been made to explore the concept ‘creation’ of organizational innovations, e.g. 
the studies of Birkinshaw & Mol (2006) and Birkinshaw et al. (2008). Both these studies have 
focused on how management innovations are ‘created’. However, while focused on the 
creation of organizational innovations, the studies also include mechanisms by which the new 
innovation is put into practice. Mechanisms for putting an organizational innovation into 
practice are in this chapter included in the section ‘Diffusion of organizational innovations’, 
since they are viewed as part of the intra-firm diffusion process. However, while the authors 
in both studies do include mechanisms for intra-firm diffusion as part of the creation process, 
they do not seem to include the body of research literature on diffusion of innovations. 
Birkinshaw et al. (2008, p. 825) consider this body of literature to be focused on diffusion of 
management innovations across industries or countries33, and state that this literature has little 
to contribute to the understanding of the creation and implementation of management 
innovations. As will be presented later in this section, however, the ‘creation’ is hard to 
separate from both the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of the innovation. Still, let us start 
this section by presenting some findings from the study of Birkinshaw et al. (2008). 
Birkinshaw et al. (2008) explored how a management innovation is ‘created’, a concept that 
has been under-researched (Kimberly, 1979; Birkinshaw et al. 2008). The core result of their 
work was a model34 influenced by factors such as the environmental context, the 
organizational context, and external and internal change agents. The four influencing sets of 
factors are very briefly explored and do not give any detailed information on which 
mechanisms in the external and organizational context influence the creation of management 
innovations, or how change agents affect this concept. The environmental context is described 
such as: “…the broad set of stimuli – exogenous to the focal organization – that shapes the 
management discourse and thereby influences the priorities and efforts of external change 
agents as they engage with organizations”. External change agents are considered to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
innovation and technology development are results of a set of relationships among actors (e.g firms, universities, 
research institutes etc.) in the system.  
33
 Here interpreted as ‘inter-firm’ diffusion. 
34
 The model is based on one developed earlier by Birkinshaw and Mol (2006). However, this previous model 
separated the step “motivation” into two steps, dissatisfaction with the status quo and inspiration, which they 
claimed usually came from outside the firm. Further, the model did not include any step for implementation. 
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“…management intellectuals, idea entrepreneurs, independent consultants, academics and 
gurus proactive in creating interest in, influencing the development of, and legitimizing the 
effectiveness and retention of new management practices (DiMaggio, 1991)”. The 
organizational context is the “…administrative and social mechanisms that management can 
manipulate to shape the behavior of actors in the organization (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 
1983) and will have a direct impact (positive or negative) on the ability of internal change 
agents to pursue the core activities associated with management innovation”. Finally, internal 
change agents are considered to be “…employees of the innovating company proactive in 
creating interest in, experimenting with, and validating the management innovation in 
question (DiMaggio, 1991; Howell & Higgins, 1990)”.  
The model itself consisted of four steps: motivation, invention, implementation, and 
theorizing and labeling. The step “motivation” is concerned with factors that create the 
motives and thereby the desirability to change the organization. The next step, “invention”, is 
experimentation “…out of which a new hypothetical management practice emerges”. This 
step included activities such as developing a solution, thinking through the consequences of 
the new idea, linking it to empirical data and testing it in practice. The next step, 
“implementation”, is “…the technical process of establishing the value of the new 
management practice in vivo (a real setting)”. This step covers all activities after the test and 
until the new innovation is fully operational. Finally, the last step, “theorizing and labeling”, 
“…is a social process whereby individuals inside and outside the organization make sense of 
and validate the management innovation to build legitimacy”. This step aimed at building a 
rationale for why the innovation should be adopted, giving the innovation a name, and 
communicating the rationale and the innovation internally and externally. Building a rationale 
for the adoption of the innovation could be done by presenting a narrative for the employees 
in order to make sense of the planned change. A narrative as a change management tool is 
also emphasized later in this chapter when sustainability of organizational innovations is 
explored. The importance of a label or name of the innovation is high, according to 
Birkinshaw et al. (2008), as it is claimed to increase the acceptability of the innovation. 
Theorizing about and labeling the innovation were also conducted in order to be able to 
communicate the innovation, not only internally but also externally35. This is interesting as it 
could be disputed whether an innovation even exists if it is not communicated. However, this 
issue was not discussed in Birkinshaw et al. (2008). 
Finally, Kimberly (1979) found that the first “release” of the innovation puts important 
constraints on later development of the organizational innovation. This finding would mean 
that the original innovation and later re-inventions of that innovation are path-dependent, i.e. 
the initial “release” of an organizational innovation will shape later releases of it. 
                                                 
35
 Alänge et al. (1998) used instead the term “standardization”, which included activities such as translation, 
packaging/describing, and labeling an innovation in order to be able to communicate and therefore diffuse it. 
 16 
 
2.2.2 The diffusion of organizational innovations 
The model by Birkinshaw et al. (2008, p. 832) is similar to the diffusion model of 
Jarnehammar (1995)36, which focused on both the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion processes 
of organizational innovations. The model of Jarnehammar (1995) included four steps in the 
diffusion process: ‘Desirability’, ‘Feasibility’, ‘First-Trial’, and ‘Implementation’. 
‘Desirability’, ‘Feasibility’, and ‘First-trial’ are covered in Birkinshaw et al.’s ‘motivation’ 
and ‘invention’ steps, while the ‘implementation’ step is similar between the two models. The 
only main difference between the two models is the step ‘Theorizing and Labeling’, which is 
not presented as a step in the model presented in Jarnehammar (1995) but covered by the term 
“standardization” that is done in the processes of creation, diffusion and sustainability of an 
organizational innovation. 
The good match between the two models, which had different purposes, is perhaps not 
surprising as Birkinshaw et al. (2008) implicitly included thoughts of both ‘inter-firm’ and 
‘intra-firm’ diffusion in their model, and since the innovation and its diffusion already in 
previous research on both technical innovations37 (Rosenberg, 1976; Ehrnberg & Jacobsson, 
1991) and on organizational innovations (Alänge et al. 1998) were assumed to be hard to 
observe in isolation as the innovation is constantly re-invented.  
 
So what can be learned from studies on the area of “diffusion of innovations”? 
Previous studies on the diffusion of innovations focus largely upon the diffusion of technical 
innovations, while diffusion scholars have less frequently studied the diffusion of 
organizational innovations (Teece, 1980; Rogers, 1995; Lynch, 2007; Birkinshaw et al., 
2008). This “gap” in research literature has therefore been emphasized as an area to be 
addressed (Lynch, 2007; Birkinshaw et al., 2008). Teece (1980) and Alänge et al. (1998) 
raised the question whether the diffusion of organizational innovations is characterized by the 
same considerations as the diffusion of technical innovations. If this would be the case it 
might be possible to re-use lessons from the area of diffusion of technical innovations to 
predict adoption patterns and speed of diffusion of organizational innovations.  
For this reason we will now explore the work of Rogers (1995) and, below, an adapted 
version of Rogers’ findings will be presented. 
                                                 
36In Jarnehammar (1995) an adapted version of the model of Shapiro & Sokol (1982) was used to study the 
diffusion of organizational innovations. This adapted model included four steps in the diffusion process: 
Desirability, Feasibility, First-Trial, and Implementation. Howard Rush suggested in 1995 the addition of a fifth 
step, “maintenance”. 
37
 In previous research it has been found hard to separate the technical innovation from its diffusion process. 
Instead a central feature of the diffusion process is how an innovation changes in the course of the diffusion 
process (Rosenberg, 1976; Ehrnberg & Jacobsson, 1991). 
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2.2.2.1 The diffusion of technical innovations 
The characteristics of the diffusion of technical innovations are well explored by Rogers 
(1995)38. He mainly studied the diffusion of technical innovations and defined diffusion as: 
“…the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995, p. 10). In other words, there are four 
elements in the diffusion of technical innovations39. These elements are the innovation, 
communication channels, time, and the social system. By better understanding the specific 
characteristics of an innovation, channels most frequently used, the issue of time, and how the 
social system (here interpreted such as the external environment) affects the diffusion, the 
overall understanding of how technical innovations diffuse can be improved.  
According to Rogers a technology usually has two components, a hardware component and a 
software component. The hardware component is the tool that embodies the technology as a 
material or physical object, while the software component could be coded commands, 
instructions and other information aspects of this tool that allow the user to use it. Rogers 
expected a technical innovation dominated by a software component to have a relatively 
lower degree of observability and thus a slower rate of diffusion, compared to technical 
innovations dominated by a hardware component. In relation to this, he identified a set of 
characteristics of the technical innovation that all, according to him, affected the rate of 
adoption.  
First, relative advantage, that is, the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than 
previously explored or adopted ideas, will affect the rate of adoption. Second, compatibility 
matters in the form of the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with 
existing values, past experience and needs of potential adopters. Third, complexity as the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use will affect the 
rate of adoption. Fourth, trialability as the degree to which an innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis will matter. And finally, observability as the degree to 
which the results of an innovation are visible to others will matter for the rate of adoption. As 
a result, Rogers found that innovations which are perceived by individuals as having greater 
relative advantage, compatibility, trialability40, observability and less complexity are assumed 
to be adopted more rapidly than other innovations.  
In addition to the characteristics of innovations, the diffusion process is influenced by the 
interdependence between innovations, diffusing at the same time (Rogers, 1995, p. 15). 
Rogers concluded that the adopter’s experience with one innovation “…obviously influences 
that individual’s perception of the next innovation to diffuse through the individual’s system”. 
                                                 
38Rogers’ first book on diffusion of technical innovation was published in the early 1960s. Since then, he studied 
the diffusion of technical innovations until his death in 2004. As technical innovations are not the focus of this 
thesis, we will delimit the description of the diffusion of technical innovations to the findings of Rogers (1995). 
39These four elements for diffusion are here assumed to be valid also for organizational innovations. 
40
“Trialability” is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis. 
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He further identified the issue of the boundaries around an innovation, i.e. where one 
innovation stops and another begins. He concluded that the potential adopters, who do the 
perceiving, determined the boundary between innovations. Finally, Rogers emphasized the 
importance of re-invention, defined as the degree to which an innovation is changed or 
modified by a user in the process of its adoption and implementation. He concluded that a 
considerable degree of re-invention occurred for many innovations, and that certain 
innovations are more flexible in nature and therefore easier to re-invent during the diffusion 
process. Rogers (1995) therefore raised the question of how to separate the technical 
innovation from the diffusion of it. 
Rogers (1995, p. 17) defined communication as “…the process by which participants create 
and share information with another in order to reach a mutual understanding”. Diffusion of 
innovation is according to Rogers a particular type of communication in which the message 
content includes a new idea. The communication is between individuals and a communication 
channel is therefore the means by which messages get from one individual to another. 
Individuals’ networks can therefore be assumed to be important for the diffusion of 
innovations. Ozman (2006) made a literature review of inter-firm networks41 and innovation. 
He found that networks influence a firm’s innovativeness and do so in several ways. First, 
networks provide knowledge spillovers. These are not only caused by formalized 
arrangements between firms, but rather a result of informal interpersonal communications 
between people working in different firms. Second, different firms have different resources 
and by interacting they can identify and access complementary resources. Third, networks 
may allow the firm to explore and exploit external knowledge bases, which in turn support the 
firm’s organizational learning and ability to innovate. Fourth, firms can imitate the behavior 
of other firms42. Fifth, managers were strongly influenced in their decision-making by their 
social network43.  
Regarding the component “time”, Rogers concluded that the time dimension was involved in 
the diffusion process in three ways: by which an individual passes from first knowledge of an 
innovation through its adoption, when discussing an individual’s or unit’s relative 
earliness/lateness with which an innovation is adopted, and with an innovation’s rate of 
adoption in a system. Regarding the rate of adoption, the distribution curve is, according to 
Rogers, in the form of an S-curve.  
                                                 
41
 In inter-firm networks he designated the firm as the node in the network and included linkages such as 
“…informal relations, mergers, acquisitions, R&D alliances, know-how trading, licensing franchising or other 
types of interaction”. As individuals’ networks could be assumed to be a foundation for communication in any of 
the above-mentioned “linkages”, it is assumed that the findings from this study also are relevant for the 
discussion on individuals’ networks. 
42Rogers’ (1995) conclusion was that imitation does happen but the transfer of ideas most frequently happens 
between two individuals who are similar (e.g. in beliefs, social status etc.), or in Rogers’ words “homophilous”. 
43This finding is also identified by Rogers, who concluded that people depend mainly on a subjective evaluation 
of an innovation that is “...conveyed to them from other individuals who have previously adopted the innovation” 
(p. 18) rather than using more scientific studies of consequences. 
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Finally, Rogers defined the social system as a set of interrelating units that are engaged in 
joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. He concluded that diffusion occurs 
within a social system and that the social structure, its norms, and opinion leaders/change 
agents of the system all affect the diffusion of innovations. In fact: “individual innovativeness 
is affected both by individual characteristics, and by the nature of the social system in which 
the individuals are members” (p. 26). He concluded, however, “Compared with other aspects 
of diffusion research there have been relatively few studies of how the social and 
communication structure affects the diffusion and adoption of innovations in a system” (p. 
25). 
2.2.2.2 Intrinsic features of organizational innovations 
Organizational innovations, however, have some intrinsic features that are quite different 
from those of technical innovations. Before attempting to apply insights from the diffusion of 
technical innovations to the diffusion of organizational innovations, we will scrutinize how 
these intrinsic features differ and may impact the diffusion process of organizational 
innovations. 
In Alänge et al. (1998), these intrinsic features have been listed along two dimensions, their 
effects on the market for organizational innovations and their effect on the search and 
implementation processes. Below, an adaptive version of the intrinsic features presented in 
Alänge et al. (1998) will be presented along the two dimensions. 
2.2.2.2.1 Effects on the market 
First, organizational innovations are characterized by knowledge, which is of a more tacit 
nature than for technical innovations (Alänge et al. 1998). An adoption of an organizational 
innovation is an investment in knowledge, procedures, behavior and relations rather than in 
artefacts, which could make it harder to protect by patents and might create a lack of incentive 
to spend resources on developing organizational innovations (Teece, 1980). Second, as a 
result of this tacitness, organizational innovations are more difficult to observe, to define and 
to identify system borders for, than technical innovations (Alänge et al. 1998). Third, the costs 
and benefits of the organizational innovation are hard to evaluate for the potential adopter, 
since there usually does not exist a traditional calculation method44 for this kind of innovation, 
and since trialability and observability could be assumed to be lower for organizational 
innovations than for technical innovations (Alänge et al. 1998). It is therefore difficult in 
advance to determine the direct effects of organizational innovations on organizational 
performance (Kimberly, 1981). Fourth, the marginal cost of production and selling is equal to 
the reproduction and transfer costs (Teece, 1980). While marginal costs are not zero (Teece, 
1976) it is expected that the discrepancy between marginal costs and fixed costs to develop 
the knowledge is substantial, which could lead to a problem of pricing the innovation on a 
market (Alänge et al. 1998). Fifth, there is no traditional supplier industry or market in the 
                                                 
44A traditional calculation method is here a financial method for calculating financial return on investment. 
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case of organizational innovations (Alänge et al. 1998). Consulting firms could however be 
regarded as some kind of “suppliers” of organizational innovations in their effort to 
conceptualize, advise, and implement organizational innovations (Bessant & Rush, 1995).  
2.2.2.2.2 Search and implementation processes 
First, as the market may not work well, the characteristics of the local search processes may 
be more important for organizational than for technical innovations, i.e. the search process 
and its conditioning factors are extremely important (Alänge et al. 1998). However, as firms 
do not usually have a position similar to an R&D manager for organizational innovations, this 
could mean a less conscious and systematic search process and not even towards explicitly 
stated goals (Alänge et al. 1998). Second, organizational innovations often affect a larger 
number of people than most technical innovations, which means that a greater number of 
people must support the innovation (Kimberly, 1981). Further, they typically involve 
organizational disruption, so a higher level of resistance and inertia towards the change could 
be expected for organizational innovations than for technical innovations (Teece, 1980). 
Third, due to the fact that many people commonly are affected by an organizational 
innovation, top management’s role could be assumed to be of another magnitude compared 
with the case of implementing technical innovations (Alänge, 1992; Spenley, 1992). Fourth, 
as organizational innovations are more tacit in their nature, they are shaped by the subjective 
interpretation of the adopter. Early adopters are here assumed to have the largest influence 
and to some extent standardize the shape of continued internal diffusion (Alänge et al. 1998). 
Further, organizational innovations are assumed to continue to change while diffusing within 
a firm. Finally, there is a mutual dependence between organizational and technical 
innovations (Leonard-Barton, 1988). However, in the case of organizational change there is a 
need to consider not only the technical and social system but also the cultural and political 
system in a firm (Tichy, 1983). 
2.2.2.3 Implications for the diffusion of organizational innovations 
The comparison showed that organizational innovations are of a more tacit nature than 
technical innovations and that there is no traditional market for organizational innovations. 
Further, there is no traditional calculation model for calculating return on investment for 
organizational innovations, they commonly affect the daily work situation of many people in 
an organization, and companies rarely have a formal position or formal strategies for 
organizational innovations similar to an R&D manager and R&D strategies for technical 
innovations45. As a result, the market mechanisms function poorly, the search and learning 
processes may be less conscious and systematic, the standardization of the innovation is based 
                                                 
45According to Birkinshaw and Mol (2006, p.87) firms can actively accelerate the management innovation process by making it more 
systematic. Their recommendations were for firms to: “become a conscious management innovator”, “create a questioning, problem-solving 
culture”, “seek analogies and exemplars from different environments”, “build a capacity for low-risk experimentation”, “make use of 
external change agents to explore new ideas and become a serial management innovator”.  
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on subjective interpretations of early adopters, and top management commitment and the 
process of intra-firm diffusion of organizational innovations become more important than in 
the case of technical innovations. 
In spite of the identified differences in intrinsic features, both Teece (1980) and Alänge et al. 
(1998) concluded that insights from studies on technical innovations could be applied with 
advantage to the study of the diffusion of organizational innovations. However, based on the 
knowledge of how technical innovations diffuse and the specific intrinsic features of 
organizational innovations, Alänge et al. (1998) draw a number of implications for the 
diffusion of organizational innovations. Table 1 below presents an adapted result of this work. 
Table 1. Implications for the diffusion of organizational innovations (OIs) 
Main implications Comment 
The nature of the innovation  
More difficult to observe, define and 
identify system borders for OI than for TI. 
Due to the tacit nature of OI, subjective interpretations and continuous re-inventions of the innovation, there is a 
need to decide when to define the OI in the diffusion process and how to define the OI. Further, there is a need to 
define when an OI is considered adopted by the firm. 
External context  
National systems of innovation are 
relevant for the inter-firm diffusion 
process. 
The institutional set-up and its inertia and path-dependency, as well as factors influencing its unlearning/learning 
processes, influence inter-firm diffusion of OIs. In addition, national standardization processes need to be 
considered.  
Other modes of transfer, substituting a 
traditional market. 
The movement of key people between firms, user networks, consulting firms, the institutional set-up and formal 
and informal individual networks are important alternatives to a “market” for OI. Regarding networks, factors such 
as size, dual networks, compatibility of network participants, and the maturity of the network are assumed to play a 
role.  
Internal context  
Path-dependent, cumulative and non-
systematic search and learning processes. 
 
The search and learning processes are not expected to be conscious and systematic. Further, considerable 
organizational inertia could be expected which tends to reinforce the cumulative character of OI. 
Path-dependency, the tendency to lock in to a particular organizational path, is therefore assumed to be stronger for 
OI than for TI. To break the path-dependency, firms need to unlearn, which in turn depends on user competence.  
No traditional financial calculation 
methods. Alternative decision criteria are 
needed. 
Alternative decision criteria could be: imitation of other successful firms, perceived crisis and/or a strong “belief”. 
High costs for transfer and implementation 
may contribute to delayed adoption of an 
OI. 
Due to OIs’ nature it is difficult and costly to imitate an OI. Further, the costs in terms of organizational disruption 
and specific firm adjustments are high. This, together with difficulties of estimating performance of an OI and 
inertia, is expected to lead to a delay in potential adoption and in extreme cases to entail a crisis. 
Standardization of the OI’s content and 
implementation may play a more 
important role than in the case of TI. 
The standardization of content and implementation can make the innovation observable and testable, reduce inertia 
and reduce transfer and implementation cost. Further, it can influence the possibility of seeing a national impact 
from the OI. The standardization can be done by e.g. the firm, by national organizations or by consulting firms. 
The role of top management is of another 
magnitude in the case of OIs. 
Top management’s user competence and commitment in the change process are more crucial for the diffusion of an 
OI than for a TI.  
A need to look at the diffusion of OI in a 
wider context. 
A wider context includes interdependences of innovations. In addition, the technical, social, cultural and political 
systems in a firm need to be considered when implementing an OI. 
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As was said above, insights from studies of technical innovations could be applied with 
advantages to the study of the diffusion of organizational innovations. However, due to 
organizational innovations’ higher degree of tacitness, they are less observable and testable 
than technical innovations. If the organizational innovation is also a so-called major 
organizational innovation, the innovation could also be more complex to observe, interpret 
and test. In addition, organizational innovations affect a higher number of people compared 
with technical innovations and are harder to evaluate, as there is no traditional financial 
calculation method in the case of this type of innovation. As a result of these issues, the 
process of standardization, the top management’s support, and its “belief” in the relative 
advantages and the compatibility between the new innovation and previously adopted 
innovations play an even more important role for organizational innovations than for technical 
innovations.  
Further, the importance of interdependence between innovations, the subjective determination 
of boundaries around an innovation and the continuous re-invention of the innovation (and 
therefore the problem of separating the innovation from its diffusion) are all more relevant to 
consider compared with the case of technical innovations. Further, networks played an 
important role in both cases for the diffusion of the innovations. However, in the case of 
organizational innovations, interpersonal networks were the main channels for diffusion, as no 
traditional market existed. Due to the lack of a traditional market, the local institutional set-
up, user networks, consulting firms, and movements of people all played an important role for 
the diffusion of organizational innovations.  
According to Rogers (1995) the social system and the individual characteristics influence the 
innovativeness of a firm. This, fits well with the conclusions from Alänge et al. (1998) where 
the national innovation system and firm characteristics such as top management and their user 
competence play important roles for the diffusion of organizational innovations. However, in 
addition to the institutional set-up of the local innovation system, the importance of local 
norms and historical experience has been emphasized by Rogers (1995) and by researchers on 
national and regional innovation systems (Lundvall, 2010; Cooke, 2001, Saxenian, 1996).  In 
fact, Saxenian (1996) indicated that not only the norms played a role in Silicon Valley’s 
success, but also the decentralized regional network-based structure and the dynamic 
capabilities of the region. Since, according to Rogers, relatively few studies have been 
conducted on how the social structure affects the diffusion of innovations, the findings in 
Alänge et al. (1998) on the importance of the local institutional set-up, together with the 
findings from Lundvall (2010), Cooke (2001) and Saxenian (1996) on the importance of 
norms and historical experience of a nation and/or region, should be considered in a 
conceptualization of the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of organizational innovations46. 
                                                 
46This could be viewed as an additional sub-contribution in this “kappa”. 
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2.3 How to sustain organizational innovations 
As the innovation in itself is constantly re-invented, and since the term “sustainability of an 
organizational innovation” emphasizes the fact that a firm should stick to a particular 
organizational innovation for a certain time period, which could be a sign of inertia 
(Buchanan et al. 2005), the concept of sustainability has to be well thought through. A 
solution could be that found by Buchanan et al. (2005). According to the authors, the concept 
‘Sustainability’ could refer to an improvement trajectory, rather than to a particular 
organizational innovation. This would according to the authors imply a more dynamic 
perspective on sustaining organizational change. The static view in form of sustaining a 
particular organizational innovation would then be only temporarily relevant.  
After a review of the literature on sustaining organizational change, Buchanan et al. (2005) 
identified four sets of factors that all played a role. The four sets were: the ‘internal context’; 
the ‘external context’; the substance of change47, the change process, and its timing; and 
finally organizational factors (factors that could be configured and interact in different ways). 
The relative importance of each set and of each factor within each set was not identified, but it 
was emphasized that the interplay between the factors played an important role. In Figure 1 an 
adapted version of the model developed by Buchanan et al. (2005, p. 202) is presented. Each 
set of factors will then be discussed. 
Figure 1. Sustainability of an organizational change 
 
 
 
First, the sustainability of an organizational innovation is influenced by the firm’s external 
context (set 1) and internal context (set 2). Factors such as the turbulence and uncertainty48 in 
the external environment and a firm’s history and therefore receptiveness to change were 
                                                 
47
 Here interpreted as a particular organizational innovation. 
48
 According to the authors, a high degree of external turbulence and uncertainty could risk the stability of 
internal changes. 
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emphasized here. Second, the substance of change (e.g. if it is perceived as important for the 
firm), the change process and its timing49 (set 3) all affect, according to the authors, the 
sustainability of an organizational change.  Third, seven organizational factors influenced the 
sustainability (set 4). These were managerial, leadership, cultural, organizational, individual, 
political and financial. The factors in the internal and external contexts were very briefly 
discussed by Buchanan et al. (2005) and did not contribute to a good understanding of how 
these two sets influence the sustainability of an organizational innovation. The same was valid 
for the set covering factors such as the substance of change, change process and timing. 
Further, the organizational factors in set 4 were not weighted in relative importance or 
discussed in depth; hence, this set also yielded little explanation of how to sustain an 
organizational innovation.  
Interesting, though, is that the authors have identified a number of factors similar to those 
found in studies of the ‘creation’ and ‘diffusion’ of organizational innovations. The external 
context and the firm’s inertia and path-dependency (as a result of a firm’s history, i.e. internal 
context) seem to play a role in all three processes. In addition, the innovation’s perceived 
importance for the organization and the timing of the innovation, matter in all three processes. 
Finally, most of the organizational factors have been identified as important also for the 
‘creation’ and ‘diffusion’ of organizational innovation. What is partly new in the model of 
Buchanan et al. (2005) are two things: first, the change process as such, which was not 
discussed by Birkinshaw et al. (2008) and was discussed only indirectly as an issue of 
standardization in the step ‘implementation’ in Alänge et al. (1998). Second, the external 
turbulence and uncertainty was identified as an inhibitor for sustaining an organizational 
innovation. The latter finding is of interest, as it could mean that it would be harder for a firm 
to sustain a particular organizational innovation in a rapidly changing industry than in the case 
the industry is more matured. This would in turn mean that the focus on an improvement 
trajectory instead of a particular organizational innovation, could be of even higher relevance 
for firms in rapidly changing industries, which could fit well with the ideas of constant 
renewal necessary in rapidly changing industries developed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 
1998).  
Regarding the improvement trajectory, it could be viewed as a number of synergistic and 
complementary organizational innovations, since the firm and its search and learning 
processes are path-dependent. For this reason, the initial innovation puts constraints on later 
development of the organization (Kimberly, 1979). In the event that a later implemented 
organizational innovation is not synergistic with and/or complementing the already 
implemented innovation, the new innovation might be seen as a start of a new improvement 
trajectory. Tools such as standardization, road maps and/or narratives could be used either to 
strengthen a certain trajectory or to communicate and make sense of a new trajectory (Wallin, 
1994; Berendse et al. 2006) 
                                                 
49
 The issue of timing here is not primarily about how early or late an innovation is adopted by a firm or about the 
overall innovation’s rate of adoption in a system (Rogers, 1995). It is rather about when the timing is right for a 
specific firm to adopt and implement a particular organizational innovation. 
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Finally, the consequences in the model, such as decay, sustainability or development of an 
organizational innovation, do not all seem relevant when the concept ‘Sustainability’ refers to 
an improvement trajectory, rather than to a particular organizational innovation. The 
development of an innovation is then viewed as a natural part of the sustainability of an 
organizational innovation. Hence there might be only two alternative consequences: ‘decay’ 
(which could mean the start of a new improvement trajectory) or ‘development’ of the 
innovation in accordance with the improvement trajectory. Sustainability of a particular 
organizational innovation can only be temporal and seems to be less relevant in rapidly 
changing environments.  
Standardization as a tool to sustain an organizational innovation has been discussed by e.g. 
Shiba et al. (1993) and Alänge (1994). Besides standardization, narratives have been 
discussed as a potential tool for sustaining organizational change by creating shared priorities 
and support for a change process (Bartel & Garud, 2009). One role of the narrative is to create 
sense in the change by connecting it to the past and to the future of the organization 
(commonly visualized in a “road map” (Wallin, 1994)). This might be of extra importance 
when the change is perceived as disrupting the historical path of the organization, and when a 
reinterpretation of the past might be necessary in order to make sense of future changes. The 
narrative could according to the authors be viewed as a tool to create an organizational 
memory of its innovations, which could also be generative for future ideas and changes. 
Berendse et al. (2006) also emphasize the importance of narratives in organizational change: 
“Conceptualizing organizational life as story-making or organizations as story-telling 
systems contributes to our understanding of organizational change”. The authors viewed 
narratives as important sense-making devices and “…they provide an important insight into 
the everyday processes of negotiating meaning among organizational actors”. Narratives, 
however, are not only important in a specific change process but could also be an important 
device to build a strong culture, which in turn could emphasize the importance of constant 
change. In this light, it can be speculated whether narratives are important for the 
organizational identity and thus for the identity of the people working in the organization. If 
this were the case, a narrative would influence not only the perception of employees, but also 
potentially the employees’ behavior. A final note in regard to narratives is the importance of 
trustworthiness. In order for a narrative to be effective, that is, influence the perception and 
behavior of employees in a way planned by management, the narrative needs to be 
trustworthy. This is achieved, among other things, when the narrative is mirrored in the 
behavior and communication of management. If the narrative is not trustworthy, the effect can 
be quite destructive both for a single change process and for the company overall.  
Finally, as was seen above, the role of management and leadership is important for sustaining 
an organizational change. However, an implementation of a major organizational innovation 
can take longer than the time a CEO on average stays in office50. For this reason there is a 
need for a “higher level” of influencers able to ensure the sustainability of the innovation or 
improvement trajectory. This higher level could consist of the owners and board. However, in 
                                                 
50On average a CEO stays in office for six years in most parts of the world (forbes.com 2008). 
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the selected literature on the sustainability of, or creation and diffusion of, organizational 
innovations, the roles of the board or owners are rarely discussed. This might seem peculiar 
since the board can be assumed to affect investment decisions on any innovation, and 
specifically so for major innovations. Further, the board could provide access to resources and 
networks, and thereby facilitate inter-firm diffusion of ideas and enhance a firm’s credibility 
and legitimacy (Bonn & Pettigrew, 2009). Finally, a board could ensure macro-stability when 
implemented major organizational innovations require many years to be fully implemented. 
2.4 Summary  
Organizational innovations can be ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ or ‘new-to-the-firm’. In this 
thesis the criterion ‘new-to-the-firm’ is used, since it can be viewed as the most frequently 
occurring of the two. Organizational innovation was therefore defined as: “an organizational 
method in the firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external relations that is 
new to a firm and intended to improve the firm’s performance”.  
In order for an organizational innovation to be long-term competitive, Hamel (2006) 
identified three conditions of which one or all must be fulfilled. These conditions were: 
“based on a novel principle that challenges management orthodoxy”, “systematic and 
encompassing a range of processes and methods”, and “part of an ongoing program of 
invention where progress compounds over time”. The organizational innovations that fulfill 
one or more of these conditions are in this “kappa” called Major Organizational Innovations 
(MOIs). The empirically studied organizational innovations – ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, ‘Lean’, and 
‘Google’ – in this thesis do all fulfill one or more of the above three conditions, so they could 
be viewed as major organizational innovations. However, as ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’ have 
mainly originated in the automobile industry, are relatively standardized, and are known for 
their focus on quality and operational efficiency, they are categorized in this “kappa” into one 
category, ‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’, while the MOI ‘Google’ was viewed as a potentially different 
type of MOI. The reason was that ‘Google’ instead originated in the Internet industry, has not 
been standardized, and is known for its focus on continuous innovation. In order to better 
understand whether ‘Google’ could be classified as a different MOI compared to the other 
three focused on quality and operational efficiency, key organizational characteristics for 
long-term competitiveness in Internet Service- related industries such as Information Services, 
Semiconductors and Telecommunication Services were presented. Interestingly, the body of 
literature studying related industries was published in the years ‘Google’ was created51 and 
could therefore potentially also bring some understanding to the context that might have 
inspired the company Google, and to what degree ‘Google’ as an organizational innovation is 
unique. The key characteristics for long-term competitiveness in Internet Service- related 
industries were found to be different from the key characteristics of the organizational 
innovations ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. These key characteristics could therefore be of interest to 
compare with the key characteristics of ‘Google’ so as to evaluate whether ‘Google’ could be 
used in testing an integrated conceptual model, based on studies of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, for 
the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of organizational innovations.  
                                                 
51By researchers, of whom several were actively working in the Silicon Valley. 
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Organizational innovations are typically intended to increase a firm’s performance by cutting 
costs, improving workforce satisfaction, gaining access to non-tradable assets or increasing 
the innovativeness of the firm. In spite of organizational innovations’ identified value for 
firms, the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations have been less 
researched (Edquist, 1992; Birkinshaw et al. 2008; Buchanan et al. 2005) than technical 
innovations. Of these three concepts, ‘creation’ and ‘sustainability’ of organizational 
innovations seem to be the two least researched areas of the three. In addition, each concept – 
‘Creation’, ‘Diffusion’, and ‘Sustainability’ – has been explored in isolation by the selected 
research, and not in the light of an overall conceptual model. Interestingly, Birkinshaw et al. 
(2008), who focused on the concept of ‘creation’ of organizational innovations, included 
mechanisms by which the new innovation was put into practice. These mechanisms “for 
putting an organizational innovation into practice” could very well be viewed as part of an 
intra-firm diffusion process. Still, the authors did not seem to include, or reflect on, the body 
of research literature on diffusion of innovations. On the contrary, they considered this body 
of literature to be focused on ‘inter-firm diffusion’ and not of great value in order to 
contribute to the understanding of the creation and implementation of management 
innovations. In addition, since the areas ‘Creation’ and ‘Sustainability’ of organizational 
innovations have been little researched, the presented research on these areas was brief and 
did not provide any deeper understanding. The concept ‘Diffusion’ was explored to a greater 
extent in Alänge et al. (1998).  
In regards to sustainability of organizational innovations, it was found that the concept 
‘sustainability’ of an organizational innovation could refer to an improvement trajectory, 
rather than to a particular organizational innovation. The improvement trajectory could in turn 
be viewed as a number of synergistic and complementary organizational innovations, since 
the firm and its search and learning processes are path-dependent. For this reason the initial 
innovation puts constraints on later development of the organization (Kimberly, 1979). In the 
event that a later implemented organizational innovation is not synergistic with and/or 
complementing the already implemented innovation, the new innovation might be seen as a 
start of a new improvement trajectory. Tools such as standardization, road maps and/or 
narratives could be used either to strengthen a certain trajectory or to communicate and make 
sense of a new trajectory. Standardization was found by Alänge et al. (1998) to be an 
important mechanism for the diffusion of an organizational innovation. However, none of the 
other studies put any emphasis on standardization. 
The three concepts Creation, Diffusion, and Sustainability were in turn affected by different 
sets of factors.  The different sets were labeled a little differently between the authors, but 
together covered issues such as the external/environmental context, internal/organizational 
context/configurations, change agents, substance of change/nature of innovation, change 
process and timing for change. However, one factor that was not discussed by any of the 
authors was the role of boards in the creation, diffusion and/or sustainability of an 
organizational innovation. This might seem peculiar as the board could provide access to 
resources and networks and thereby facilitate inter-firm diffusion and enhance a firm’s 
credibility and legitimacy, but also ensure macro-stability in the case of major organizational 
innovations requiring many years to be fully implemented. 
 28 
 
Based on our understanding that the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of organizational 
innovations are less researched than technical innovations, and that a board, as an 
“influencing factor”, has not been investigated by the selected researchers, three main focus 
areas for the empirical studies were decided upon. First, findings from literature on the 
diffusion of technical innovations were explored in Paper I in order to evaluate whether they 
could be useful for an analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational 
innovations. In addition, organizational innovations’ intrinsic features were compared with 
those of technical innovations. The result in the form of a developed analytical framework for 
studying the diffusion of organizational innovations was then empirically tested in Paper II. 
Second, as the roles of boards have not been explored in the selected research, a board’s roles 
in sustaining major organizational innovations were explored in Paper III. Finally, as the 
selected theories had focused primarily on one of the three concepts in relative isolation, the 
well-known innovative organization of Google Inc. was investigated in order to see how this 
organization had been; created, diffused and sustained, over its first 12 years and how it was 
characterized. In the next chapter, the methodology for the empirical studies will be 
presented. 
Finally, as the three concepts – creation, diffusion, and sustainability of organizational 
innovations – have been researched in relative isolation from one another, this “kappa” 
contributes in two ways. Firstly it provides “a conceptualization” of how organizational 
innovations are created, diffused, and sustained”. Secondly it “tests how characteristics of an 
organizational innovation affect the applicability of the conceptualization”.  
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3 Methodology  
This thesis is based on four papers and a “kappa”. The first paper was published in 1998. The 
second paper was based on empirical data from 1993-1996 but also on retrospective 
interviews conducted in 2006 and 2008. An early first version of this paper was presented in 
Jarnehammar (1995) and a revised version, now including new data collected in 2006 and 
2008, was published in 2011. The reason for this delay was that the author’s Ph.D. process 
paused between 1995 and 2006 due to a career in the private sector. In 2006, the Ph.D. 
process was started again, in parallel with a regular manager position. This led to one 
published paper in 2009 (Paper III) and one published paper in 2011 (Paper II)52. In 2010, the 
project ‘Google’ was kicked off. The project was conducted in Silicon Valley, California. The 
temporary move to California was important in order to truly understand the Google culture 
and mindset as well as the unique environment that Google originated in. The result of this 
project was a conference paper presented at the 9th International Triple Helix conference at 
Stanford University, July 2011 and Paper IV, which has been submitted for publication in 
2012. Finally, the “kappa”, with its own two research questions, was written in 2011/ 2012 
and is primarily based on the findings and conclusions in the four papers. 
This chapter provides a description of the research design and methods used in each paper. 
The chapter starts with presenting the underlying scientific perspective used by the author. In 
the second and third sections of this chapter, the method employed in the different papers and 
the details on data collection, sample selection and analysis will be presented. Finally, the last 
section discusses the validity and reliability of the employed method and data collection, and 
provides reflections on the overall research process. 
3.1 Scientific perspective 
The primary perspective used in this thesis is the firm-level perspective rather than the 
perspective of an innovation system, of a team, or of single individuals. The firm-level 
perspective is further represented by: board members, top management53 and other employees.  
In addition, the underlying scientific perspective used in this thesis is that an understanding of 
the social world is created through an examination of the interviewees’ interpretation of that 
world54. According to Bryman & Bell (2011) this is a quite common perspective within the 
                                                 
52Important to note is that only ‘TQM’ was studied in Paper II, while ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean Production’ were 
studied in Paper III. This means that the framework for diffusion of organizational innovations is based on the 
study of TQM alone. However, in the study of boards’ roles in sustaining major organizational innovations 
(Paper III), data on how the studied innovations ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’ were created and diffused was 
indirectly provided; hence, findings on how organizational innovations are created and diffused were also found 
in Paper III.  
53It could be argued that the board and top management of the firm are “teams” so that the analysis could include 
two levels, the level of the firm and the level of teams. However, none of the included papers have explicitly 
studied the composition and group dynamics of the board or management teams, and thus the level of analysis 
most correctly is the firm. 
54This means that the collection of knowledge was mainly influenced by an interpretative discourse. An 
interpretative discourse regards sense-making individuals as active participants, as co-creators of social 
structures, using ethnographic and hermeneutic methods to establish local meanings grounded in social and 
organizational practices (Buchanan & Bryman, 2007). 
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area of qualitative research, compared with quantitative research, which is influenced by a 
natural-scientific notion of what counts as acceptable knowledge. The perspective is further 
that the interviewees, due to their unique experience, expectations and position in the firm, 
will contribute with slightly different information. By interviewing a critical number of 
interviewees it is therefore possible to create an interpretation, which represents the social 
world of the firm. This collective interpretation is then used as the researcher’s understanding 
of the firm and its social world. The collective interpretation is experienced to exist either as a 
result of a sample size decided already at the beginning55, or when each new interview 
provides only marginally new information. Both approaches put demands on size and design 
of the sample. If the primary unit for analysis is the firm and the goal is to receive a collective 
interpretation that represents most employees’ interpretation of their social world, the sample 
has to be large enough and consist of relevant but diverse individuals, representing different 
functions and different levels of the firm. 
When the collective interpretation was revealed, the researchers considered this as an accurate 
picture from the perspective of the interviewees. The interview notes were not validated later 
through a “respondent validation” (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The main reason behind this 
decision was that we did not want to give the interviewees a chance to regret more 
strategically or politically sensitive information they had provided and thereby to withdraw 
these important data from the interview material. In the case of Google, though, we plan to 
validate and further develop our findings through a future workshop in which the findings will 
be presented and discussed.  
In the event that the involved researchers interpreted certain data differently, a converged 
view was developed through a discussion or by turning back to key informants and asking for 
a clarification, or even an interpretation. 
The language and terminology used when asking questions and collecting data are in most 
respects the language and terminology used by the participants. However, as people are 
assumed to potentially have different reasons (political, public relations, etc.) for their choice 
of answers to interview questions, issues such as tonality, body language, and surrounding 
context were also considered when building the case story. In this way, the participants’ 
version of their social world could be both better understood and critically screened by the 
researchers.  
In order to check the validity and reliability of a specific case, there is however a need for a 
health-check of empirical findings with previous research. The specific social world of a firm 
is therefore viewed through the lenses of both practitioners (the interviewees) and academics 
(the researchers) and is in this way validated from two sides. The transfer of knowledge 
between these two worlds is not always easy, and misinterpretations can be assumed if the 
researchers do not have enough experience from both worlds. This competence was secured 
through the choice of fellow researcher. The author chose to work with a senior researcher 
                                                 
55In some cases, the size of the sample is decided by the company, by the funder or designer of the project or by 
time limits on the project. 
 31 
 
with a high degree of academic experience in the area of management and organization, 
supplemented with academic experience of areas such as innovation systems, open innovation 
and organizational behavior/sociology. Further, the senior researcher had long experience of 
conducting qualitative studies. In addition to academic and methodological experience, the 
senior researcher had also a good understanding of the public and private sectors, mainly 
through many years of consulting. By supplementing the senior researcher’s broad portfolio 
of academic and business knowledge and experience with the author’s own, academic 
knowledge and extensive practical experience from the business sector, the social world of a 
firm could be better understood through both an academic and a practical lens.  
However, the interpretation of information is based not only on the researchers’ portfolio of 
knowledge and experience but also on their own beliefs and view of the social world. The 
firm is viewed in this thesis as rational, and management (or the board) introduces and 
sustains organizational innovations with the goal of making its firm more effective and 
competitive. The employees are regarded as intelligent and always striving to do the best for 
the company. In addition, the firm is assumed to be part of an environment and is influenced 
by its environment. The firm and its top management are assumed to be able to affect, manage 
and control not only their company but also parts of their external environment.  
3.2 Choice of method 
The method selected for each research study should optimally be the proper method for the 
research topic. However, there are usually several other issues influencing choice of method. 
According to Buchanan & Bryman (2007), these issues are organizational (size, location etc.), 
historical (experience, traditions etc.), personal (preferences, competencies, relationships etc.), 
political (negotiated objectives, layered permission, stakeholder demands etc.), evidential 
(different audiences such as academic, management etc.) and ethical (heightened scrutiny, 
codes of practice etc.). The selection of method in this thesis was influenced by most of the 
above issues. The choice of method was based on the experience and preferences of the 
research team, the final permission from involved companies, and the historical tradition 
within the faculty56. Further, the primary contact persons and these individuals’ contact 
network within the selected firms or organizations affected the size and content of the sample.  
3.2.1 Selected method 
The purpose of Paper I was to explore the extent to which the more recent literature on 
technical innovations and their diffusion could contribute to a useful analytical framework for 
studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. For this reason, the chosen method was a 
literature review. 
Papers II, III and IV, however, were based on a qualitative method. The reason behind the 
choice of a qualitative method was that Papers II-IV were exploring complex phenomena with 
uncertain correlations between sub-elements and with limited previous research to use for 
                                                 
56The faculty conducts mostly explorative studies and therefore commonly uses qualitative methods.  
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guidance. A qualitative method enables a refined description, as it can provide “…richness 
and holism, with strong potential for revealing complexity” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 
10). 
As all three papers have an exploratory character, the research design chosen was a case study 
approach. Case studies can impose constraints upon generalizability of findings, but are useful 
when trying to develop new theory rather than testing existing theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). A 
case study approach was therefore chosen since it enables the kind of nuanced documentation 
that is required in order to address the previously mentioned research questions. 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
The data collection and analysis related to each paper will now be described, but first some 
words on how the theory in each paper was built up. 
In order to build up the theory an abductive approach (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) was used. 
According to Dubois & Gadde (2002, p. 559) an abductive approach is used in theory 
development rather than theory generation. The research team therefore started the research 
project by conducting a literature review and developed a first skeleton for a framework. This 
framework was used when developing focus areas and questions in the questionnaires. 
However by using coding and categorization of empirical findings, the original framework 
was successively developed during the research process. The framework was also developed 
by new literature reviews, triggered by empirical findings. 
3.3.1 Paper I 
The purpose of Paper I was to explore the extent to which the more recent literature on 
innovation and diffusion, with a prime focus on technical innovations, could contribute to a 
useful analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, various researchers, including Rosenberg (1976) and Freeman 
(1987), developed the theoretical view of technical innovations and their diffusion. During 
this time, however, research on organizational innovations and their diffusion had not 
witnessed a similar development. For this reason it was of interest to learn whether more 
recent literature on technical innovation and diffusion could contribute to the shaping of an 
analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. As a 
consequence a literature review was conducted on technical innovations and their diffusion 
(e.g. research done by Thirtle and Ruttan, 1987; David, 1988; Dosi, 1988, Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Edquist, 1992; Lundvall, 1992; Carlsson & Jacobsson, 1994). In addition, a 
literature review was performed on research on the diffusion of organizational innovations 
(e.g. Teece, 1980; Kimberly, 1981; Leonard-Barton, 1988). 
After reviewing the selected literature, intrinsic features of technical and organizational 
innovations were compared. Finally, it was explored what the identified differences in 
intrinsic features may mean for an analytical framework specially developed for studying 
organizational innovations. Paper I was published in 1998. 
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3.3.2 Paper II 
The purpose of Paper II was to empirically test the analytical framework developed in Paper I. 
The organizational innovation chosen was Total Quality Management (‘TQM’), and the 
sample of case studies chosen consisted of a Swedish manufacturing company in the private 
sector, Electrolux Storkök AB in Alingsås and a Swedish service-producing organization in 
the public sector, Mölndal Hospital in Mölndal. The rationale behind the choice of the two 
cases was that they represented different industries and products and that they were known to 
have an ongoing implementation of ‘TQM’. 
The data were collected in several steps. First, data were collected in 1993 on the 
organizational innovation ‘TQM’. The definition of ‘TQM’ used in Paper II was derived from 
empirical data drawn from a number of companies considered to be early adopters of the 
TQM approach in Japan (Toyota, Minolta and Fuji Xerox), the U.S. (Motorola and Xerox 
Corporation) and Europe (Rank Xerox, Pitney Bowes UK and ABB Sweden). The empirical 
data were collected through face-to-face interviews with people on various levels and in 
various positions in the companies. An open-ended questionnaire, focused on different 
elements such as leadership, processes and customer focus, was used. The empirical data were 
supplemented by a review of definitions and core values used by quality awards (e.g. 
Malcolm Baldrige and European Quality Award) and a literature review on total quality (e.g. 
Ishikawa, 1985, Imai, 1986; JUSE, 1987; Garvin, 1988; Oakland, 1989; Womack et al. 1990; 
Bergman och Klefsjö, 1991; Kenney & Florida, 1991; Alänge, 1992; Spenley, 1992; Tenner 
and DeToro, 1992; Monden, 1993). The data on ‘TQM’ were then analyzed with the aim of 
identifying and integrating common components of ‘TQM’ found in the literature and in our 
case studies. The common components identified were then organized into a descriptive 
model of ‘TQM’ developed through the use of an affinity diagram. Six main categories were 
found: customer focus, visible leadership, total approach, continuous learning, process 
orientation, and standardization for creativity (Alänge, 1994). 
Second, data were collected in 1994 on a case level. Data were collected through tape-
recorded face-to-face interviews and a questionnaire. In the case of Electrolux, the production 
department was chosen as the main area of study, supplemented by interviews with managers 
in Marketing, Finance and Product development. In total, 16 employees on different levels 
(CEO, Director, Manager, work leader and shop-floor worker) were interviewed. In the case 
of Mölndal Hospital two clinical departments were chosen as the main areas of study. 
Supplementary interviews were made at a number of service departments. In total 26 
employees on different levels (CEO, head of quality, head of clinical department, physicians, 
nurses and different kind of support personnel) were interviewed. In both cases and on all 
levels below top management, one strong believer and one disbeliever were chosen as 
interviewees after suggestions from the managers of the different levels. The questions were 
open-ended and divided into two parts. One part concentrated more on the factors influencing 
the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion processes, while the other part tried to find out how far 
the company had come in the implementation of ‘TQM’. Each interview lasted between one 
and three hours. For the purpose of minimizing the sources of error, all interviewees in the 
same occupational position within the organizations were asked the same questions. In 
addition, a questionnaire was handed out to the top management and quality officers. This 
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questionnaire was mainly based on the questions developed for the EQA, European Quality 
Award. The purpose of the questionnaire was to support the personal interviews in order to 
get as clear and correct a picture as possible regarding how far the company had come in their 
implementation of ‘TQM’. In addition, eight retrospective interviews were conducted in 2006 
and 2008 with interviewees who had been part of the Mölndal Hospital case. Two of the 
interviewees in these retrospective interviews had also been interviewed in 1994. 
Each interview was transcribed and read by both researchers. The two cases were documented 
and then analyzed according to two analytical strategies. First, according to a descriptive 
framework in the form of a diffusion model. The model chosen was a diffusion model, 
inspired by Shapero and Sokol (1982), who argued that the perception of desirability and the 
perception of feasibility are different steps that help determine the actions seriously 
considered and the actions taken. The diffusion model therefore ended up with four phases: 
the perception of desirability, the perception of feasibility, first trial and implementation. The 
division between first trial and implementation was made for analytical reasons, in order to 
distinguish between single trials of the innovation and a broad-based internal diffusion 
process. Second, the case studies were analyzed according to our tentative analytical 
framework. By using the analytical framework in the comparative analysis, we could 
investigate both whether the different concepts of the framework were relevant and when, in 
which phase in the diffusion model, the concepts were valid. 
The cases and findings were presented in a paper in Jarnehammar (1995). In 2010 a major 
revision of the original paper was accepted for publication (Alänge & Steiber, 2011). 
3.3.3 Paper III 
The purpose of Paper III was to investigate the board’s role in sustaining major organizational 
innovations. First a literature review was conducted, focused on management and 
organization, the diffusion of organizational innovation, and corporate governance. As a 
second step three cases were selected, based on the criterion that they all had implemented a 
major organizational innovation. The organizations included in the study were three Swedish 
companies: Mölndal Hospital, Fagersta Stainless AB and Scania AB. They represented 
different industries but had all adopted and implemented major organizational innovations 
such as ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’ (Scania Production System), and ‘Lean’. One reason for selecting 
Mölndal Hospital and Fagersta Stainless AB was that in-depth research data on major 
organizational innovations inside these organizations had been collected from previous Ph.D. 
students’ research (Jarnehammar 1995 and Book 2006). However, although the CEOs had 
been interviewed in these studies, the board level had not previously been researched. 
Through these studies we were aware that in both organizations the CEOs had been replaced 
after a period of 5-6 years. Hence, Scania AB was primarily selected as an example of a 
company where the CEO had remained over a longer period of time (20 years). 
Data were collected through individual interviews. Each interview was around one hour and 
was conducted either face-to-face or over the telephone. The interviewees selected were board 
members, CEOs, and key employees that had insights on the diffusion of the firm-specific 
organizational innovation, how the board worked, and the relationship between the board and 
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CEO. In total 18 individuals were interviewed, of whom five were chairmen of boards, four 
were board members, four were CEOs, and five were key employees. Interview guides were 
developed and used. The initial literature review and Paper II were used in order to identify 
relevant and critical questions, but also to identify questions that have not been asked in 
previous literature. Three interview guides were designed, all with open-ended questions. One 
was for the CEOs, one for the chairman of the board and other board members, and one for 
key employees. 
The process for analyzing data was conducted in three main steps. First, each interview was 
transcribed, read by both researchers and analyzed. Second, each case was documented. The 
description of the case included a description of the diffusion and sustainability of the firm-
specific organizational innovation (here the descriptive framework developed in Paper II was 
used) and the roles taken by the board and the CEO. Third, each case was carefully read and 
analyzed by both researchers and findings were identified jointly in a series of meetings, 
primarily over the telephone. Finally, the empirical findings were related to findings made by 
previous researchers within the areas of corporate governance, diffusion of organizational 
innovations and management and organization. Paper III was published in 2009 (Alänge & 
Steiber, 2009). 
3.3.4 Paper IV 
The purpose of Paper IV was to explore organizational characteristics for continuous 
innovation in rapidly changing industries. Literature reviews and a single-case, empirical 
study at Google were conducted. According to Yin (1994), a single case is valid if the case 
has a unique character. In this case, this was the first empirical study of this kind conducted at 
Google, so it was regarded as having a unique value.   
First a literature review was conducted. Previous research was collected on “innovation 
management”, “innovation capability,” “literature review and innovation”, “sustaining 
innovativeness,” and “sustaining innovation”.  The aim was to identify research literature that 
had focused on firms’ innovativeness and on organizational characteristics for continuous 
innovation and/or long-term competitiveness. As a result, the literature review was not 
conducted within a specific discipline or area but more guided by the “research topic”. 
Secondary data on Google were used if Google themselves had distributed it. Examples of 
these data were YouTube clips, press releases, IPO letter etc. Previous research articles or 
books about Google, such as Iyer and Davenport (2008), Girard (2009), and Auletta (2009), 
were however not included in the first collection of secondary data, as the intention was to 
research the company from the perspective of its employees and not through the 
interpretations of other researchers or consultants. 
Second, the collection of primary data was conducted over an eight-month period in 2010. 
The study included face-to-face interviews with 28 selected Google employees. The 28 
interviewees were selected through a three-step-process. First the research team created a list 
of requested “interviewee characteristics”. These characteristics were geographical region, 
function, position, product, and gender. In addition, the candidates from product management 
and engineering were to have experience with established products as well as with newly 
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developed ones and from successes and relative “failures”. Further, the interviewees were to 
hold certain tenure57 in the firm and to have worked with, or expressed an interest in, 
innovation. As a second step, the Google sponsor for the research project identified 
employees who matched the requested characteristics. A list of potential interviewees was 
created, and the research team selected the final sample of interviewees. Finally, the sponsor 
scheduled time for an interview with each selected employee. Most of the 28 interviewees 
were at a director level (directors account for fewer than five percent of the total employees) 
but the sample also included two non-managers and two vice presidents. Seven interviewees 
were women (25 percent). Collectively, the interviewees covered several regions (Europe, 
USA, Asia, etc.) and most functions. They also covered product areas such as Search, Geo, 
Mobile, Chrome, Social networking, AdWords and AdSense and External Developers.  
The interview guide was semi-structured with open-ended questions. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour and was tape-recorded and later transcribed. In addition to the semi-
structured questionnaire a framework consisting of seven organizational elements was used in 
the end of each interview. The interviewee was asked to rank the seven elements in order 
according to their relative importance in explaining Google’s innovativeness. Each of the 
seven elements had been mentioned in previous research literature as potentially important for 
a firm’s innovativeness. The interviewees were also given the opportunity to add new 
elements to the list, although none of the interviewees chose to do so. However, the 
interviews did disclose that corporate communication and brand might play an influencing 
role on the firm’s innovativeness. Because of this, the last two interviews included questions 
concerning corporate communication and brand.  
After the interviews had been transcribed, the two researchers who had jointly conducted 
most of the interviews read them independently. Based on this reading, the information in the 
interviews was coded independently and then transferred to Post-its, which were then used to 
build sub-categories through an affinity technique. The two researchers conducted this 
grouping process jointly. These sub-categories served as a basis for writing an in-depth case 
study, which was organized around the identified areas that influenced and sustained the 
firm’s innovativeness.  
Finally, a second literature review was conducted, on the one hand in order to analyze and 
validate empirical findings and, on the other hand, to provide additional insights about 
organizational characteristics, on a firm level, important for a firm’s innovativeness long-term 
in rapidly changing environments. The second literature review therefore focused on previous 
research, which had aimed at exploring, on a firm level, aspects of an organization that could 
explain and sustain a firm’s innovativeness, primarily in rapidly changing industries. The 
selected research studies were either directly focused on the topic “innovativeness” or 
strongly related to this topic (e.g. long-term competitiveness).  
                                                 
57The interviewees that had been in the company almost since its start were asked questions on where 
organizational ideas originally came from, who were the influential people in the process of creating the 
organization, and how the organization has been re-invented over time. 
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3.4 Reliability and validity 
There has been a discussion of whether terms such as reliability and validity are correctly 
used in the case of qualitative research. Some researchers believe that the terms are relevant 
but their meanings need to be altered. Other researchers suggest totally new criteria, e.g. 
trustworthiness and authenticity (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In this thesis, the first strategy will 
be used, that is, the two terms are viewed as relevant but will be slightly adjusted due to the 
qualitative nature of the studies. 
3.4.1 Internal and external reliability 
Internal reliability in a qualitative study exists when more than one researcher, as members of 
the research team, agree about what they see and hear (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The research 
team in the three empirically based papers consisted of two researchers. The two researchers 
conducted most of the interviews together and shared the same; secondary data, transcribed 
interviews and selected previous research. Usually the two researchers did have a common 
perception on key findings from different sources of data. In the case where the two 
researchers did not agree on findings, the topic was discussed thoroughly and, if necessary, 
the researchers went back to the original source of the data or in some cases returned to ask 
key informants at the companies. 
External reliability can be defined as the possibility to replicate the study. A perfect 
replication is almost by default a rare phenomenon: “This is a difficult criterion to meet in 
qualitative research, since, as LeCompte and Goetz recognize, it is impossible to freeze a 
social setting and the circumstances of an initial study to make it replicable in the sense in 
which the term is usually employed” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 395). The difficulty of 
“freezing” the social setting is also valid for the organizational innovation ‘TQM’. Even if the 
researcher does find a case where ‘TQM’ is implemented, and although it is a rather 
standardized innovation, ‘TQM’ still exists in different variants (‘TQM’ in the 1990s was 
defined slightly differently than in the 2000s) and it can be perceived slightly differently by 
different organizations. However, the external reliability can be increased somewhat if the 
researcher, replicating a qualitative study, adopts a role similar to that which was used by the 
original researcher, and tries to select an object and characteristics of a case study, similar to 
the object and characteristics of the original study. Further, a complete record held of all 
phases of the research process would increase external reliability. In this thesis, all material 
used in Papers I-IV was stored. Examples of this material were secondary data, internal 
company documentation, questionnaires, interviewees (name, company and position), 
transcribed interviews, and personal notes on reflections made during interviews or during 
analysis of primary and secondary data.  
3.4.2 Internal and external validity 
Internal validity refers to how well the collected data match the reality that they seek to 
represent. According to Bryman and Bell (2011) qualitative research has a strength compared 
to quantitative research, due to the prolonged participation in the social life of a group over a 
relative long period of time. This might not be the case for the qualitative studies mentioned 
in Papers II, III and IV, as the participation in the company and its social life only took place 
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more or less at the time of the interviews. However, since face-to-face interviews provide an 
opportunity to ask follow-up questions, and provide information not only through what is said 
but also through body language and through observation of the social context around the 
interviewee, the data might better match reality than would a collection of data through a 
quantitative study. There are, however, ways to increase internal validity – such as 
triangulation, which is the use of more than one method or source of data (Bryman & Bell, 
2011; Yin, 1994), and respondent validation, whereby the researcher provides the 
interviewees with an account of his/her findings. In all three qualitative studies, multiple 
sources of data have been used. Further, each study aimed for having a sample that consisted 
of at least 15 interviewees and was broad in that it included different functions, levels, 
genders and products/services, geographical locations and opposite opinions (the last three if 
they were applicable). By using a quite broad sample, internal documentation and, when 
feasible, observations, the internal validity could be increased. Another approach was to 
compare collected data with existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such comparisons and 
contrasts were made in all four papers. 
One dilemma in all qualitative studies is the fact that both the interviewer and the interviewee 
may be biased. The interviewer is biased by his/her values and experiences (Flick, 2006) but 
also by the goal of the research and of the project. Two approaches were chosen to try to 
minimize this form of bias. First, all interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed word-by-
word and shared between the two researchers. Second, no hypotheses or detail assumptions 
were formulated and decided early on in the study. The research question, in contrast, was 
broad on purpose. In addition, the findings were built on detailed case descriptions, which in 
turn were built up by interview data that had been coded and categorized by the researchers.  
Another dilemma is that the interviewee, besides being biased regarding personal values and 
experiences, is afraid of being subject to undesired repercussions. This risk was limited by 
writing Non-Disclosure Agreements, and in many cases by promising the interviewees total 
anonymity. 
The external validity can be defined as the possibility to draw general conclusions from the 
conducted research, or in the words of Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 395), “…the degree to 
which findings can be generalized across social settings”. It is often argued that case studies 
impose constraints upon the external validity of findings given the explicit focus on a certain 
event and the fact that qualitative research usually uses small samples58 (Yin, 1994; Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). The argument for choosing case studies in Papers II-IV was that all papers were 
explorative in their character. According to Eisenhardt (1989) case studies can be motivated 
when little is known about the phenomenon and existing theories seem inadequate or 
                                                 
58The fact that the sample of cases in all three studies was limited, varying between only one and three, may 
lower the external validity of the research. The choice, however, was between number of cases and depth of each 
case. As the studies were explorative in their character, we chose to increase the depth in each case, rather than 
increase the number of cases.  
 
 39 
 
insufficient. However, in order to decrease the risk of low external validity, all cases were in a 
first version produced as thick descriptions that can “…provide others with a database for 
making judgements about possible transferability of findings to other milieus” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). Further, the cases were related and compared with other relevant research, i.e. 
previous research acted as a health-check of whether findings seemed reasonable and relevant 
for the research community.  
3.5 Reflections on the research process  
The purpose of this thesis is, from a firm-level perspective, to contribute to our understanding 
of how organizational innovations are created, diffused, and sustained. However, as was 
described in the introduction, the research process has not been perfectly structured and linear 
but rather formed as a result of a learning process. The findings in Paper I therefore affected 
the focus for Paper II and so on. This might be seen as natural, and particularly if it had been 
within the same area of research, e.g. diffusion of innovations. But when exploring topics in 
totally new areas such as corporate governance, the consequence was that each new study was 
conducted in parallel with an extensive learning process for the researcher. One example of 
this was the finding in Paper II that boards might be important to include in the analysis when 
studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. In order to be able to explore the roles of 
boards in sustaining organizational innovations (Paper III), not only literature on the diffusion 
of organizational innovations and management and organization had to be penetrated but also 
a totally new area, corporate governance. This might be positive as it broadens the 
understanding and perspective of the researcher and of the research community. Yet it might 
also affect the level of analysis and even lead to wrong conclusions. In this case the benefit 
with the scope might affect the quality of the analysis and can result in unrealistic or wrong 
conclusions. In order to limit this risk in Paper III, the findings and conclusions were tested on 
two sub-groups within the research community. The first presentation was conducted at 
EUROMA in 2009 and the second at the 12th International QMOD Conference in 2009. 
Further, the paper went through a peer review process before publication in 2009. 
 
When studying a complex phenomenon such as innovation and a firm’s innovativeness, many 
lenses are needed in order to fully understand the phenomenon. The limitation in this thesis is 
the lack of knowledge from many disciplines that would be of value for understanding a 
firm’s innovativeness. Examples of disciplines that are not covered in this thesis are human 
resource management, psychology, entrepreneurship, and deeper knowledge in areas such as 
system theories, evolution and chaos theories, and organizational behavior. 
In addition, the study in Paper IV did not explicitly include organizational elements such as 
corporate communication and IT. One finding from this study was that corporate 
communication affected the firm’s innovativeness. This finding was a result of the interviews, 
rather than an element included from the start in the case study. As a consequence the 
research team tested this element only in two interviews; hence no valid findings could be 
presented in the final documentation. IT, which could be considered important for real-time 
communication, sharing of lessons learned, short development and test cycles etc., was 
implicitly covered by being part of the corporate system at Google, but was not explicitly 
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investigated as a separate organizational element. A reason why neither corporate 
communication nor IT was covered in the study could be that the focus of the researchers was 
more on general organizational elements. 
The researchers involved in the four studies were focused on applied research rather than on 
highly theoretical research. This could be beneficial, as practitioners hopefully can then use 
findings and conclusions to improve the competitiveness of their businesses. However, it may 
also be a risk, as the researchers’ interest is not primarily to do ground research, which might 
be important for creating truly new innovative insights, but to focus more on research that 
rather quickly can be applied and used in the industry. The risk that a researcher searches for 
knowledge that can have a value on a more or less short-term basis can be enforced if the 
researcher has been working in the industry for many years and has been trained to think as a 
practitioner. Peer reviews in connection to publication in research papers were however used 
in securing scientific value and quality of research. 
In addition, the new findings and conclusions are influenced by some overall role models 
within a certain research area, and by the role models for an individual researcher. Even if 
there is an intention to search broadly for relevant articles and books on a subject, the 
references selected are usually to researchers who are well known and well cited or have 
become favourites for the researcher. The advantage of this kind of literature is that it 
probably has high quality and has been peer-reviewed by many researchers, so that potential 
faults or limitations should have been identified and noted. The risk is that we all are victims 
of inertia and follow a few tracks to what is accepted knowledge.  
Related to this is how old the data are when published. In many cases the publication process 
takes years, and then the book or article may include data that at the publication date are 3-4 
years old. One way to get around this problem is to supplement the literature with personal or 
telephone interviews with selected researchers in order to identify the most “up-to-date” 
insights59.  
Finally, the case studies, with the exception of Google, were Swedish firms. The issue of the 
national culture and its potential effect on the phenomenon of study was not analyzed or 
discussed in the studies. This weakness in Papers II and III was partly managed by selecting 
Swedish cases with an international presence (except Mölndal Hospital) and by comparing 
findings in Papers II and III with findings in Paper IV, in which the issue of regional/national 
culture is considered. However, in retrospect it might have been better if case studies included 
in the same study, had been in different countries.  
 
                                                 
59The data and findings in Papers I and II were approximately 12 years old when Paper II was finally published 
in 2011. For this reason a follow-up literature review on the area “diffusion of organizational innovations” was 
conducted in the period 2006-2008 (before publication) in order to conduct a novelty check and external 
validation of the findings in Paper II. The result from the follow-up literature review was that the findings in 
Paper II still were quite novel and relevant for the research community. 
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4 Summary of appended papers 
This thesis includes the “kappa”, three published and one submitted paper. The papers are 
appended in full at the end of the thesis. This chapter will present a brief summary of each 
paper. 
4.1 Paper I: Some Aspects of an Analytical Framework for 
Studying the Diffusion of Organizational Innovations 
The objective of this paper was to explore the extent to which literature on innovation and 
diffusion, with a prime focus on technical innovations, can contribute to a useful analytical 
framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations (Alänge et al. 1998). 
Research literature on the diffusion of technical and organizational innovations was reviewed, 
and intrinsic features of technical and organizational innovations were compared. It was then 
explored what these differences may mean for an analytical framework specifically developed 
for studying organizational innovations.  
The initial answer was that the characteristics affecting the innovation and diffusion of 
technical innovations are valid also when studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. 
Key issues valid for both types of innovation are that the innovations are to a varying degree 
tacit in nature, and their diffusion depends on a learning process where user competence, 
unlearning and interrelatedness between innovations matter. Due to the tacit nature, 
innovation and diffusion cannot be distinguished in a meaningful way, but the diffusion curve 
should be seen as an envelope curve, superimposed by a number of minor diffusion curves. 
Firms build upon an existing knowledge base when they search for new opportunities. 
Learning and innovation are therefore path-dependent and largely local in nature. The 
technological or organizational distance and the spatial context influence the search process as 
well as the firm’s absorptive capacity. Increasing return also applies to the process of 
innovation, and initial specialization tends to be reproduced and strengthened. Further, a local 
market is important. The role of the market is to diffuse information, provide access to new 
products or solutions, collect feedback from customers, change the price/performance ratio 
etc. In addition, top management’s involvement plays a role for both types of innovation. And 
finally, there are complementarities of technical and organizational innovations – i.e. a change 
of both technology and organization is beneficial. However, there are also important 
differences that affect the diffusion process for organizational innovations and lead to a 
number of implications.  
First, organizational innovations are characterized by knowledge bases, which are of a more 
tacit nature than for technical innovations. This fact makes it difficult to observe, define, and 
protect the innovations. It might create ownership problems and possibly a lack of incentive to 
develop organizational innovations for a market. Further, a traditional supplier industry is 
non-existent. Consulting firms and universities may be regarded as some kind of suppliers. 
The market in a traditional sense, therefore, does not exist. In addition, as organizational 
innovation refers to the creation of knowledge and therefore the marginal cost of “production” 
and selling is equal to the reproduction and transfer costs, it is expected that the discrepancy 
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between marginal costs and fixed costs to develop the knowledge is substantial. This would 
lead to problems with pricing, where price is clearly expected to be far above marginal costs. 
The implication of not having a traditional market for this type of innovations is that other 
non-market modes of transfer have to be considered. As a result the local institutional set-up, 
together with consulting firms, user networks, and the movement of people, could all be 
important modes of transfer. 
Second, organizational innovations are more difficult to observe beforehand and to 
experiment with than most technical innovations. This means that the cost and benefit of the 
organizational innovation are hard to evaluate for a potential adopter. Further, the 
organizational innovation can be assumed to change even more during the diffusion process, 
and the early adopters inside an organization could be assumed to have the largest influence 
on the standardization of the innovation for continued internal diffusion. The implication is 
that the organizational innovation must be defined at the time of the initial adoption decision, 
but also when it is continuously being modified during the intra-firm diffusion. The internal 
standardization process, both of the content and of the implementation process, needs to be 
studied.  
Third, organizational innovations often affect a larger number of individuals than most 
technical innovations. A greater number of people must therefore support an organizational 
innovation before it is adopted and implemented. Moreover, a major organizational 
innovation typically involves organizational disruption in that it is associated with a major 
reassignment of tasks. Taken jointly, this may mean that organizational innovations meet 
greater internal resistance than technical innovations. Hence there is a need to supplement the 
theoretical framework for technical innovations, primarily focused on inter-firm diffusion, 
with a focus also on the intra-firm diffusion. 
Fourth, organizations are not assumed to have specialized units, analogous to an R&D 
function for technical innovations. This could be assumed to lead to a less conscious and 
systematic search for organizational innovations. The implication should be that factors, 
which condition the search and learning processes are essential to analyze, including the 
impact of organizational distance. User competence is critical and unlearning is central to 
include.  
Fifth, while top management can serve an important function in the decision to adopt 
technical innovations, in the case of organizational change the importance of top management 
involvement and visible support in order to implement and sustain organizational innovations 
is of another magnitude. The implication is that the role and behavior of top management and 
potentially also other leaders are essential to focus on.  
Sixth, for technical innovations it could be assumed that there is a routine and a calculation 
method to be used before making an investment decision. Organizational innovations concern 
humans, as mentioned above. Changes in behavior, attitudes, and work processes are so-
called intangible assets, which makes it harder to calculate costs and benefits of an 
organizational innovation. The difference between the marginal and fixed costs for an 
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organizational innovation, the difficulty of observing and trying out an organizational 
innovation, and the adjustments of the innovation according to subjective interpretations, all 
contribute to the fact that it is harder to calculate costs and benefits. The implication is that 
there is a need to find alternative decision criteria.  
Finally, studies on organizational change, developed from an organizational development 
perspective, have emphasized the need to consider simultaneously not only technical and 
social systems, but also political and cultural systems. The implication is that a broad set of 
factors needs to be considered in order to understand the diffusion of organizational 
innovations. Technical, social, but also political and cultural factors should be taken into 
account. 
To sum up, research literature on diffusion of technical innovations can contribute to shaping 
an analytical framework for studying the diffusion of organizational innovations. However, 
due to unique characteristics of organizational innovations some modifications are required. 
In particular the role of factors inside the firm and of non-market mechanisms for transfer of 
organizational innovations needs special attention. 
4.2 Paper II: Diffusion of Organizational Innovations: An 
empirical test of an analytical framework  
The objective of this paper was to examine the validity of the analytical framework developed 
in Paper I.  For this purpose, a qualitative study of two companies, Elextrolux Storkök AB and 
Mölndal Hospital, were carried out on the diffusion of the organizational innovation ‘TQM’ 
(Alänge and Steiber, 2011).  
A comparative analysis between the two cases showed that the framework was valid and that 
central issues emphasized in the framework were highly relevant. The key concepts included 
were all relevant for analyzing both cases and the framework was found to be useful for 
distinguishing and discussing similarities and differences between the two cases. However, 
the analysis of the two cases also indicated areas where further research was needed in order 
to develop an in-depth understanding of the diffusion of organizational innovations. 
As organizational innovations were considered as more tacit than technical innovations in 
Paper I, it was assumed that the implementation would meet greater resistance and inertia due 
to limited possibilities to observe and test the innovation and the assumed effect it would have 
on employees’ work context. The assumption of higher internal resistance and inertia, 
however, was not supported in the study. One explanation for this was the standardization of 
the innovation on a national and a firm level, the use of pilot studies of sub-components 
before any broader internal diffusion took place, and the emphasis on communication from 
top management all the way down the organization. The barrier to change rather depended on 
the specific character of the innovation and the interdependence between parallel and 
sequential innovations. However, the diffusion of ‘TQM’ in both cases was a cumulative and 
path-dependent learning process, and each company initially focused on sub-components that 
were more familiar to it. 
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The search and learning processes were affected by the organizational distance and 
interdependences with other organizational innovations. The organizational distance was 
found to influence in two ways. First, a large organizational distance blocked the initial 
perceptions of desirability and feasibility. Second, an organizational distance on a process 
level negatively affected the diffusion of the innovation during first-trial and implementation. 
Further, the assumption that search for and learning of organizational innovations was not 
done in a conscious and systematic way was proved to be incorrect, as one of the cases had 
developed a separate department for searching, learning and guiding in the inter-firm and 
intra-firm diffusion of the innovation.  
In both cases, the national and regional context influenced the search and learning processes. 
However, both cases also searched for information and knowledge on an international level. 
There was, however, no traditional market for ‘TQM’. Instead, non-market diffusion channels 
such as the local institutional set-up, consulting firms, user-networks (other organizations at, 
most commonly, a short organizational distance) and the movement of people played an 
important role. As a consequence, a deeper understanding of the role of individual networks 
in the diffusion process would therefore be of interest to develop. The non-traditional 
suppliers of the organizational innovation ‘TQM’, transferred knowledge and experience, 
created a social legitimacy and provided support. Further, top management’s user competence 
was found to be critical for the diffusion process. In both cases, the managing directors were 
strong believers in total quality and laid the foundation, which facilitated the continued search 
for a feasible path towards the introduction of total quality. However, both cases also 
indicated that the forces above influenced top management, e.g. top management of the whole 
group, owner and/or the board of directors. One conclusion was therefore that there is a need 
to include this “higher layer” of influencers in future analysis. 
Further, costs and benefits for implementing TQM were not calculated; alternative decision 
criteria were used in both cases. Examples of factors that influenced the decision were: 
demand from top management and/or market, perceived crisis, fads, national bridging 
institutions, user-networks, the CEO’s previous experience and personal beliefs, and 
previously adopted organizational innovations. Finally, the analysis of the two cases did not 
include, in a systematic way, a model for considering the importance of the technical, social, 
political, and cultural systems. It was therefore concluded that it would be of interest to add 
this filter to the analysis in order to investigate how the diffusion of organizational 
innovations is affected by these subsystems in a firm.  
To sum up, the analytical framework proved to be valid but there were some assumptions that 
proved wrong (e.g. the assumptions of higher internal resistance and inertia, difficulties for a 
firm in observing and testing an organizational innovation, and that the search and learning 
processes for organizational innovations are not systematic and conscious). The study also 
identified a number of areas for future research. These were: individual networks and “higher-
influencers” roles in the diffusion process, the importance of the environmental context 
(international, national and local) and the importance of adding a “filter” in the framework 
that deals in greater detail with the interdependences between innovations and the technical, 
social, political and cultural subsystems in a firm. 
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4.3 Paper III: The board’s roles in sustaining major 
organizational innovations  
The purpose of Paper III was to analyze how boards affect the sustainability of major 
organizational innovations (Alänge and Steiber, 2009).  
After a review of research articles within the area of management and organization, diffusion 
of organizational innovations and corporate governance, a number of initial observations 
could be made. First, the research literature that focused on organizational change brought up 
the importance of top management clearly and frequently. But the role of the board and its 
responsibility as regards decisions concerning implementation and sustainability of major 
organizational innovations had not, with a few exceptions, been discussed. This discussion 
was also lacking in research literature within the areas of diffusion of organizational 
innovations and corporate governance.  
Second, the dominant theory within the field of corporate governance proved to be the 
Principal-Agency theory, which is built on the assumption that there is a divergence in goals 
and risk preferences between the principal (the board) and the agent (the CEO). The objective 
is therefore to reduce agency cost by imposing internal control. This is commonly done in two 
ways: by establishing financial incentives that aim at aligning the interests of the principal and 
the agent, and a governance structure where boards of directors keep potentially self-serving 
managers in check by performing audits and performance evaluations. By using the Principal-
Agency theory as the underlying theory, the relationship between the board and the CEO 
could be viewed as based on mistrust, and the main task of the board is to monitor and control 
the CEO. This in turn was assumed to affect the roles of the board and the cooperation 
between the board and the CEO. Two other comparable theories, the Stewardship theory and 
the Resource Dependence theory, depict the CEO as collectivist, pro-organizational and 
trustworthy (Stewardship theory) and depict the board as active and responsible for seeking 
necessary resources, reducing environmental uncertainty, and developing links and 
arrangements with different organizations in the environment (Resource Dependence theory).  
Third, the focus in corporate governance research literature has been on issues such as the 
structure of the board, the board’s composition, and primary tasks of the board such as 
monitoring, advising, and counseling top management. It is only during the past few years 
that there has been an increasing interest in more pro-active and externally oriented roles such 
as strategy involvement and resource provision.  
Fourth, the currently used business-report system leads to a lack of information about 
investments in more intangible assets among board members. There has been a development 
towards enhanced business reporting (EBR), but these initiatives have not been harmonized 
and no standard has been developed. This means in turn that a board must actively ask the 
CEO for data on investments in more intangible assets, such as an investment in a new 
organizational innovation. 
The second step in the research process was to conduct a qualitative study of three companies. 
The companies included in the study were: Mölndal Hospital, Scania AB, and Fagersta 
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Stainless AB. The three organizations were all different in regard to industry, products 
delivered and corporate government structure. The organizational innovations chosen were 
‘TQM’, ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’, all viewed as major organizational innovations. A comparison 
between the three cases, looking at similarities and differences across the three organizations, 
provided insights into several issues that were important in order to create board commitment 
for sustaining major organizational innovations. These issues were: board competence and 
experience; board meeting dynamics; the board as a provider of critical resources; and the 
board as responsible for the process of replacing CEOs. The research indicated, however, that 
the roles, which the board chose to take, were affected by the underlying theory of how to best 
govern a firm. The dominant theory, the Principal-Agency theory, was assumed to hinder the 
board in taking on more collaborative and active roles. In contrast, the Stewardship and 
Resource Dependence theories were assumed to raise both the degree of collaboration 
between the board and the CEO and the level of board commitment to being an active part of 
the development of a firm.  
Therefore, in order to sustain a major organizational innovation, a number of board 
responsibilities were identified. First, the board needs to have (or develop) enough insight to 
understand how its chosen roles affect a firm’s innovativeness. Second, a board must view 
itself as an organizational body that can and must provide critical resources to a firm. As a 
consequence, a board must proactively gather knowledge about the firm and its industry, and 
create an effective board group and work processes, based on norms that support a strategic, 
collaborative, innovative and open environment within the board and between the board and 
the CEO. Finally, a board needs to take the responsibility to create a process ensuring long-
term success of major organizational innovations in the replacement of CEOs (Paper III). 
To sum up, there are board-related issues that do affect the sustainability of major 
organizational innovations. These issues were: board competence and experience, board 
meeting dynamics, and the board as provider of resources and replacement of CEO. These 
board issues in turn influenced how proactive a board was in the strategic development of the 
firm. Further, the board’s roles are affected by the underlying theories of how to govern the 
firm. A change from the Principal-Agency theory toward the Stewardship and Resource 
Dependence theories would affect how the board viewed its own mission and roles. The 
Principal-Agency theory was not assumed to support the desired identified board roles that 
were needed in order to sustain major organizational innovations. 
4.4 Paper IV: A corporate system for continuous 
innovation: the case of Google Inc.  
The purpose of this paper is to explore, from a firm-level perspective, organizational 
characteristics for continuous innovation in rapidly changing industries. The paper is based on 
an in-depth empirical study of Google complemented by literature reviews on organizational 
characteristics for continuous innovation. 
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Twenty-eight Google employees were asked to give their view on what influenced Google’s 
innovativeness60 and how to sustain this ability over time. The interviewees were also asked to 
rank, in relative order, seven different organizational elements’ influence on Google’s 
innovativeness.  
In addition to an improved understanding on how different organizational elements influenced 
Google’s innovativeness, the empirical study also provided insights on how Google’s 
organization for continuous innovation was created, diffused and sustained. This data will 
later be used in this “kappa”. 
4.4.1 An open and dynamic corporate system 
Google’s organization for continuous innovation can be viewed as a dynamic and open 
corporate system for innovation, involving the entire organization and supported by an 
innovation-oriented top management and board. The system is visualized below in Figure 2, 
as consisting of five main building blocks: key drivers, facilitators, hygiene factors, external 
interaction, and the foundation. Each block includes organizational characteristics important 
for Google’s continuous innovation.  
Figure 2. Google’s corporate system for continuous innovation 
 
                                                 
60
 Innovativeness or the ability to continuously innovate is a central concept in this study. Innovativeness 
includes being successful on the market launching new product and business models, but it does not necessarily 
mean that a company needs to be successful in all market launches. No failures could as well indicate risk 
aversion, and subsequently be an indicator of a less innovative firm. Also an ability to learn from mistakes and of 
closing failed attempts relatively early on could be signs of innovativeness (Alänge & Miconnet, 2001).  
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The first six organizational characteristics (an innovation-oriented & change-prone culture; 
competent & committed individuals with a passion to innovate; leaders that empower, coach 
and remove obstacles for innovation; a semi-structured and ambidextrous organization; 
innovation-oriented performance and incentive systems; and continuous learning) play 
different roles such as drivers, facilitators, and more or less necessary hygiene factors. The 
seventh organizational characteristic is the long-term commitment of the innovation-oriented 
and change-prone top management and board that was the foundation upon which Google has 
built its corporate system for continuous innovation. The eighth characteristic is that the 
corporate system was open enough in order to embrace good ideas and innovations from 
everywhere. 
4.4.1.1 The key drivers of innovation 
This building block consists of two organizational characteristics: a culture that is focused on 
innovation and continuous renewal, and competent and committed individuals, eager to 
innovate. The strong innovation-oriented culture, together with creative and smart individuals 
with a passion to change the world and to innovate, created a strong drive towards continuous 
innovation. This drive was further increased by a strong peer effect among individuals at 
Google. As the culture also emphasized a constant renewal, the individuals were constantly 
prepared for change. This need for constant renewal was based on top management’s mindset 
and then realized through the change-prone culture (that in turn affected e.g. the 
organizational structure, management processes, and employees’ expectations). The 
importance of culture and individuals meant that Human Resources had a more active role in 
creating, diffusing and sustaining the right culture and talents.  
4.4.1.2 Top management as the foundation and leaders as facilitators 
The founders and other members of the Operating committee and the Board had tenure, were 
innovation-oriented and change-prone. They created the very foundation for Google’s 
continuous innovation by strongly influencing the culture, the organizational design, but also 
all other organizational elements as well.   
 
Leaders in general acted as the main facilitators for innovations. Leaders directed their teams 
and encouraged innovations by acting as facilitators, connectors and cultural ambassadors in 
the firm. Google’s leadership was described as a “bottom-up leadership in parallel with an 
overall direction provided from a top management perspective”. In order to encourage and 
sustain innovations, leaders were carefully selected, both during the hiring process and 
through the internal promotion system. The role of the leader had received an increased focus 
internally during the last years.  
4.4.1.3 The hygiene factors for innovation 
Organizational structure, performance and incentive systems, as well as organizational 
learning were found important to design correctly in order to positively affect Google’s 
innovativeness. These three elements seem to encourage innovative behavior if correctly 
designed but also inhibit innovations if incorrectly designed. Because of this, they are referred 
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to as “hygiene factors.” The Google case strongly emphasized the importance of a semi-
structured, non-bureaucratic organization with the mindset of a small company. In this 
organization, innovative ideas were believed to come from anyone and everywhere through a 
bottom-up process. In parallel with ideas coming from the bottom up, clear goals and 
priorities came from the top down.  
 
The performance and incentive system rewarded innovative behavior, both financially and by 
recognition. Google’s employees also emphasized the importance of intrinsic motivation 
generated by a challenging mission, smart colleagues and a technical infrastructure that allows 
scalable solutions.  
 
Finally, organizational learning was a natural part of Google’s mindset and was encouraged 
by the value of “openness” and the rule of “share as much as you can”. The use of heuristic 
rules to guide and speed up the innovation processes indicates that Google utilizes previous 
learning by formulating rules of thumb.  
4.4.1.4 External interaction and open innovation 
Google’s senior management had chosen to establish specific units with responsibility for 
external screening and sourcing. They have in other words taken measures to complement 
their internal innovation processes. This has allowed the company to better sustain its ability 
to be innovative by utilizing innovations that originate both internally and externally. 
Therefore, Google’s corporate system for innovation could be viewed as an open system. 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that the whole organization was open. Instead, parts 
of the organization were found quite “closed” as they strove to focus mainly on their own 
ideas or solutions in order to be able to create new major innovations. This might be one 
reason why this element was ranked low, as most of the interviewees did not work in the 
externally oriented units. Another reason could be how the questions were asked. Also the 
influence from Silicon Valley was perceived as not very important for explaining Google’s 
innovativeness. Still, a number of norms in the Valley were similar to those at Google, so the 
Valley seems to have influenced Google potentially more than the interviewees themselves 
realized.  
4.4.2 Comparison to selected research 
During the last decades, there are a number of researchers that from a firm-level perspective 
have sought to identify organizational characteristics for continuous innovation. However, 
even though these studies have used a firm-level perspective (rather than a process, team or 
individual perspective), the studies have aimed to answer different questions. For example, a 
number of studies have focused on capabilities required in order to remain competitive in 
rapidly changing industries (Leonard-Barton 1992; Teece et al. 1997; Teece 2007; Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Wang & Ahmed 2007). Others have studied what it 
takes to simultaneously manage exploration and exploitation (Tushman & O’Reilly III 1997; 
Tushman et al. 2010). Some studies have explored how to capitalize on internal and external 
technologies (Chesbrough, 2003). Others have explored characteristics needed for continual 
renewal and innovation (Brown & Eisenhardt 1997, 1998), and yet others have explored 
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factors for sustaining corporate success (Matzler et al. 201061) or how managers can affect 
innovation success (Lawson & Samson 2001). Only a few studies have expressed ambitions 
to describe or create comprehensive organizational models for continuous innovation (some 
studies that have explicitly tried are: Tidd et al. 199762; O’Connor 2008; and Garud et al. 
2011). While the above research studies focused on the organizational characteristics for 
continuous innovation in fast-moving industries, Kalling (2007) used a different approach. He 
instead looked into the obstacles (organizational and institutional factors) for continuous 
innovation in a mature and more slow-moving industry. However, several characteristics 
identified are identical, although these characteristics that would have been conducive for 
innovation were missing. Similarly, Danneels (2010) used the case of Smith Corona, failing to 
renew itself, in order to empirically contribute to dynamic capability theory. By observing the 
managers’ lack of understanding of their perceived key resources, he concluded that ‘resource 
cognition’ would be an important addition to the theory.    
A comparison between this previous research literature and the Google case provided several 
insights. First, previous research findings on continuous innovation in rapidly changing 
industries are relevant and useful when discussing and analyzing Google’s organization for 
continuous innovation. The comparison however, identified a need for further integration of 
previous findings into an organizational framework for continuous innovation. Insights from 
Google could provide additional understanding of how a corporate system, conducive to 
innovation, is to be designed. It is also clear that some issues of this organizational framework 
need further investigation, e.g. whether continuous innovation and continuous improvement 
could be managed in the same organization or not. Finally, the comparison identified that 
there is a need to emphasize and better understand factors such as culture and individuals, and 
how these influence a firm’s ability to continuously innovate. Data from Google indicate that 
culture and individuals are decisive for continuous innovativeness and that an important 
leader role is to facilitate and contribute to creating/sustaining an innovation culture. The 
importance of individuals and culture might in turn create a need for a change in managers’ 
mental model of how to best run and therefore organize a company for continuous innovation, 
including how to select and develop people, not least for leadership roles. 
 
To sum up, the organization behind Google’s innovativeness could be described as a dynamic 
and open corporate system for continuous innovation. The organizational elements in the 
corporate system were mutually dependent and well aligned towards common corporate 
goals. Further, they played different roles for continuous innovation. While some were key 
drivers for innovations, others were more or less hygiene factors. Further, the corporate 
system was characterized by eight organizational characteristics. During the last decades, 
there are a number of researchers that from a similar firm-level perspective have sought to 
                                                 
61
 The objective of the study was to identify the driving factors behind corporate success in what the researchers 
assume to be an increasingly fast-changing environment. The study covered a wide range of industries. No 
information is given on which industries are included.  
62
 Tidd et al. (1997) partly build their findings on data from companies like Apple, Google, and Microsoft. 
However, they also base their findings on literature that is not specifically focused on rapidly changing 
industries, e.g. the work of Mintzberg (1979) and Pfeffer (1998). 
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identify organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in fast-changing 
environments. A comparison between these findings and the findings from Google provided a 
number of important insights, e.g. that previous findings could be used in the analysis of 
Google and its organization; that the Google case indicates a need for a further integration of 
previous findings into one organizational framework for continuous innovation; that some 
issues of the framework need further investigation; and that factors such as culture and 
individuals need further attention by innovation researchers. 
 
4.5 Summary of empirical findings from all papers 
A number of empirical findings were identified in each paper. Below, the concluding findings 
from all four papers will be summarized. 
First, findings in literature with a prime focus on the diffusion of technical innovations were 
seen in Paper I to be useful for studying the diffusion also of organizational innovations. This 
was despite a number of considerations63, which suggested that the diffusion pattern might be 
different for organizational innovations. In Paper II it was shown that the search and learning 
processes for organizational innovations were both conscious and systematic (contrary to 
what was assumed in Paper I). Further, the search and learning processes were cumulative and 
path-dependent, and each company initially focused on sub-components that were more 
familiar to it. This created a form of inertia through interdependences with earlier or parallel 
organizational innovations. The search and learning processes were affected by the local and 
national contexts, but there were indications in Paper II that the search and learning process 
was also to a certain degree international. On local, national and international levels, the 
perceived organizational distance affected the search and learning processes. Organizational 
distance was found to be influential in two ways. First, a large organizational distance blocks 
the initial perceptions of desirability and feasibility. Second, a large organizational distance 
on a process level hinders diffusion during first- trial and implementation. Further, the 
problem of separating the innovation from the diffusion process was even more relevant in the 
case of organizational innovations than for technical innovations.  
The problem of observing and testing the tacit organizational innovation was managed 
through a certain degree of standardization – of both the innovation itself and its 
implementation. The standardization process of the organizational innovations was done on 
several levels, such as the national and firm levels. On the firm level, early adopters 
influenced the initial standardization of the organizational innovation. The organizational 
innovation was later adjusted to the local context based on experiences from pilot tests and the 
implementation process. In addition to lowering the transfer and implementation costs, the 
standardization also decreased the resistance towards the change among the organizational 
members. Further, due to organizational innovations’ specific nature, non-market-mediated 
                                                 
63Examples of these considerations were: a higher degree of tacitness; lack of a traditional market; problems in 
calculating costs and benefits of the investment; a higher degree of organizational disruption; and lack of a 
traditional R&D function for organizational innovations. 
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interpersonal contacts were one of the primary channels for diffusion of the studied 
organizational innovations. Examples of these contacts were user networks (parallel 
organizations implementing the same organizational innovation), the local institutional set-up, 
and the movement of people between firms. An additional important channel for diffusion of 
organizational innovations was consulting firms.  
Traditional calculation methods were not used in the decision to invest in organizational 
innovations.  Instead, top management was influenced by issues such as demand from the 
managers and/or market, perceived crisis, fads, national bridging institutions, the CEO’s 
previous experience and personal beliefs, and previously adopted organizational innovations. 
The actual decision seemed to be more or less based on a belief in the organizational 
innovation. Finally, it was found that in the diffusion of organizational innovations, not only 
top management’s commitment was crucial, but also the commitment of “higher layers of 
influencers”.  
Second, major organizational innovations, such as ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’, demand several 
years of implementation (according to Paper III, between 5 and 10 years). Paper II identified 
the need for a more long-term view in order to sustain major organizational innovations, a 
view that goes beyond the time that the average CEO stays at the helm. This observation 
pointed to the importance of including boards in studies of organizational innovations. A 
number of board issues were identified in Paper III in order to create board commitment for 
sustaining a major organizational innovation. These were: board competence and experience; 
board meeting dynamics; the board as a provider of critical resources; and the process for 
replacing CEOs. However, the underlying theories (e.g. the Principal-Agency theory, 
Stewardship theory and Resource Dependence theory) on how to best govern a firm were 
found to affect boards’ perception of their mission and main roles (Paper III). The dominant 
theory, the Principal-Agency theory, was assumed to negatively affect boards’ involvement 
and commitment for sustaining a major organizational innovation, while the two other 
theories were assumed to enable both a closer relationship between the board and CEO and 
more active board roles such as e.g. the role as a resource provider. Therefore, in order to 
sustain a major organizational innovation the board must have insight into how its roles affect 
the sustainability of implemented major organizational innovations. Further, a board must 
view itself as an organizational body that can and must provide critical resources to the firm. 
As a consequence, a board must proactively gather knowledge about the firm and industry and 
create an effective board group and work processes, based on norms that support a strategic, 
collaborative, innovative and open environment within the board and between the board and 
the CEO. In addition, a board must take the responsibility to create a process ensuring long-
term success of major organizational innovations in case the CEO is replaced. Finally, it was 
found in Papers II, III and IV that boards also influenced the creation and diffusion of 
organizational innovations (not only their sustainability).  
Third, the major organizational innovation in Paper IV could be viewed as a dynamic and 
open corporate system for continuous innovation. The corporate system could in turn be 
visualized as consisting of five main building blocks: key drivers, facilitators, hygiene factors, 
external interaction, and the foundation. The key drivers were identified to be: an innovation-
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oriented & change-prone culture, and competent & committed individuals with a passion to 
innovate. The facilitators are leaders that empower, coach and remove obstacles for 
innovation. The hygiene factors are: a semi-structured and ambidextrous organization, 
innovation-oriented performance and incentive systems, and continuous learning. The 
foundation of the corporate system is the innovation-oriented and change-prone top 
management and board. Finally, the corporate system is open enough to embrace good ideas 
and innovations from everywhere. In a comparison with previous research on continuous 
innovation in rapidly changing industries, it were found that previous research findings need 
to be further integrated into one organizational framework for continuous innovation. It was 
further found that some issues of this framework for continuous innovation need further 
investigation and that the importance of factors such as culture and individuals might need a 
change of managers’ mental model on how to best organize for continuous innovation.  
In the next chapter, the empirical findings in Papers I, II, and III will be discussed in the light 
of the findings in the theoretical framework. As a result, a conceptual model for the creation, 
diffusion, and sustainability of organizational innovations will be presented. Key 
characteristics of ‘Google’ will then be discussed in the light of previous research findings on 
organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in rapidly changing industries64. By 
doing this, we will get some understanding of ‘Google’s degree of uniqueness. Further, we 
will assess whether ‘Google’ is sufficiently different from ‘TQM’/ ‘TPS’/‘Lean’ to be useful 
in a test of the presented conceptual model. Finally, we will test the conceptual model by 
using data from the empirical study behind Paper IV. These data contribute additional insights 
on how Google’s organization for continuous innovation was created, diffused and sustained.  
 
                                                 
64
 This research is presented in the theoretical framework. 
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5 Discussion  
Two main research questions were asked in the beginning of this “kappa”:  
1. How can the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations be 
understood and conceptualized?  
2. How do the characteristics of organizational innovations affect the applicability of the 
conceptualization?  
This chapter aims to discuss these two research questions. First a conceptualization will be 
conducted of the previously isolated and limited researched concepts: ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’, 
and ‘sustainability’ of organizational innovations. In addition to the integration of those three 
concepts, three main sets of influencing factors (Set 1 = External context and diffusion 
channels, Set 2 = Internal context, and Set 3 = Characteristics of innovation) will be discussed 
on a level of detail that has not occurred in previous selected research, and then embedded in 
the conceptual model. The conceptual model for the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of 
organizational innovations will thereafter be visualized in the end of the first section. The 
conceptual model is primarily based on insights from Papers I, II and III but also includes two 
issues: sustainability of an improvement trajectory, rather than of a particular organizational 
innovation (Buchanan et al. 2005), and the external influence of “local norms” (Lundvall, 
1992)65. 
Second, the major organizational innovations ‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’, studied in Papers II and 
III, are to a large extent developed in the automobile industry66, are well standardized and are 
known for their focus on quality and operational efficiency. The conceptual model developed 
in the first section will therefore be tested on an organizational innovation labeled ‘Google’, 
originally developed in the younger and rapidly changing Internet Service industry. This 
innovation is not standardized and is focused on continuous innovation, rather than on quality 
and operational efficiency. The purpose of this test is primarily to be able to answer research 
question 2, i.e. “How do the characteristics of organizational innovations affect the 
applicability of the conceptualization”. However, before this test is conducted, the major 
organizational innovation ‘Google’ will be discussed in the light of previous research findings 
on organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in Internet Service- related 
industries. The main reasons for this are to answer a number of sub-questions such as whether 
‘Google’ is a unique major organizational innovation, and whether the characteristics of 
‘Google’ are different enough from the characteristics of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ to motivate a 
test of the conceptual model. 
                                                 
65In Paper I, Lundvall (1992) was referred to and included in the development of a framework for analyzing the 
diffusion of organizational innovations. However, the importance of local norms as such was not explicitly 
highlighted or emphasized, so this issue is brought up as an issue presented by research other than our own. 
66Another industry that acted as a pioneer was the steel industry. We included Fagersta Stainless AB in Paper III, 
as one case from this industry. 
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5.1 How can the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of 
organizational innovations be understood and 
conceptualized (RQ1)  
In this section the three, concepts: ‘Creation’, ‘Diffusion’, and ‘Sustainability’, previously 
explored in isolation, will be discussed. Further the three sets of influencing factors: External 
context and diffusion channels, Internal context and the characteristics of the innovation will 
be discussed in more detail than was done in previous selected research. Finally, a conceptual 
model that integrates the key findings in Papers I, II, and III will be presented.  
5.1.1 The creation and diffusion of organizational innovations 
5.1.1.1 The creation of organizational innovations 
As with technical innovations (Rogers, 1995) the creation and diffusion of organizational 
innovations were found in both Paper I and Paper II to be two intertwined concepts, which 
made it hard to study the creation of organizational innovations separately from their inter-
firm and intra-firm diffusion67. This is especially true when an organizational innovation is 
adopted from external sources and by default is diffused and locally adjusted to the adopting 
firm.  
Previous research has explored the concepts ‘creation’ and ‘diffusion’ more or less in 
isolation. The exploration of the ‘creation’ of management innovations in Birkinshaw et al. 
(2008) did not, therefore, discuss the dilemma that the two concepts are intertwined. In fact, 
their model includes a number of logical oversights. First, they defined management 
innovations such as ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ rather than ‘new-to-the-firm’. This meant 
that an innovation could be either a result of a local isolated innovation process (no diffusion 
of external ideas being necessary), or a result of a totally unique combination of diffused 
ideas, or a unique mix of diffused and own ideas (which ironically would indicate that 
creation and diffusion are intertwined). However, since they did not reflect on whether the 
two concepts are intertwined, the option of a local isolated innovation process must have been 
their main focus for the study. This is peculiar, as they refer in the same study and model to an 
external context and external change agents, which probably influence a firm with external 
ideas. Second, they stated that the literature on inter-firm diffusion had a limited value for 
explaining the creation of management innovations, so this literature did not seem to be 
included in their theoretical framework. This would mean that the process of creating 
management innovations more or less starts at the border of the firm, rather than in e.g. the 
local institutional set-up. Yet that again is illogical since, as was mentioned above, they 
discussed the importance of the external context and external change agents. 
The finding is instead that the creation of organizational innovations is a result of inter-firm 
and intra-firm diffusion processes, in which existing external organizational ideas are 
                                                 
67In Paper I it was found that the innovation and diffusion cannot be distinguished in a meaningful way, but the 
diffusion curve should be seen as an envelope curve, superimposed by a number of minor diffusion curves. 
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combined with potentially new firm-specific ideas. Their combination is either ‘new-to-the 
firm’ or both ‘new-to-the-firm’ and ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’. An organizational 
innovation is then constantly re-invented and adjusted after implementation due to internal 
and external changes. ‘Creation’ and ‘Diffusion’ are therefore two concepts that cannot be 
separated and analyzed in isolation, but are highly intertwined, not only before but also after 
implementation. 
5.1.1.2 The diffusion of organizational innovations 
Regarding organizational innovations’ diffusion, it was clear from Paper I and Paper II, that 
insights from the diffusion of technical innovations could be used when studying the diffusion 
of organizational innovations. However, when testing the developed analytical framework for 
studying the diffusion of organizational innovations, a number of theoretical assumptions 
proved wrong and new findings were identified. Below, the empirical findings in Paper II 
about the diffusion of organizational innovations will be presented and discussed. Factors 
influencing the diffusion of organizational innovations will be structured and discussed 
according to three main areas68, namely the characteristics of the innovation, the external 
context and primary diffusion channels, and finally the internal context. 
First, due to the tacit nature of organizational innovations, two aspects were found important 
in regard to the innovation itself. First, the separation between the innovation process and 
the diffusion process was, as assumed in Paper I, even less relevant for organizational 
innovations than for technical innovations. Second, organizational innovations were re-
invented (Rogers, 1995) and standardized (Alänge et al. 1998) while diffusing. The 
organizational innovation was therefore continuously re-invented through the inter-firm and 
intra-firm diffusion processes. The standardizations of the innovation were primarily done on 
a national and on a firm level. Bridging institutions played an important role in the work of 
standardizing (or re-standardizing) the organizational innovation on a national level, while 
early adopters influenced the initial standardization of the innovation on a firm level. 
Interestingly, the finding that standardization processes matter for the diffusion of 
organizational innovations was only identified in Alänge et al. (1998), not in any of the other 
studies explored in the chapter ‘Theoretical framework’ in this “kappa”.  
Second, the external context, or in Rogers’ (1995) words “the social structure”, influenced 
the rate of diffusion of organizational innovations. The institutional set-up, the existence of 
international and national fads, the existence of new market needs (such as ISO 9000), the 
presence of consulting firms, user networks (commonly organizations at a limited 
organizational distance that had adopted the innovation) and movement of people, all 
influenced the rate of diffusion of a major organizational innovation. However, the inertia 
and path-dependency of the external context itself also influenced the rate of diffusion. 
Further, the institutional set-up, consulting firms, user networks and the movement of people, 
all substituted for a traditional market. As a consequence, individuals’ networks with e.g. 
                                                 
68See Table 1. 
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standardization/industry organizations, companies that already had adopted the innovations 
and with people with experience of the innovation played a profound role in the case of 
organizational innovations (Rogers, 1995; Paper II).  
Third, the internal context was influential in several ways. To begin with, the characteristics 
of the search and learning processes for organizational innovations were indeed cumulative 
and path-dependent but also conscious and systematic, and affected both by the local 
environment and by international so-called “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973)69. The facts that 
the search and learning processes were conscious and systematic, and both local and 
international, were contrary to the original assumption in Paper I. Further, organizational 
distance was found relevant and to exist on two levels: a surface level affecting steps such as 
desirability and feasibility in the diffusion process,70 and a process level influencing steps such 
as first-trial and implementation. Moreover, inertia and resistance towards the organizational 
innovation constitute an influencing factor, but were not found to a larger extent than in the 
case of technical innovations. Some explanations for this were the commitment and 
communication from top management and the use of pilot studies of sub-components. Such 
use of pilot studies contradicts Teece’s (1980) assumption that an incremental implementation 
is less likely for organizational innovations. In addition, due to the possibility of observing 
and testing the innovation or part of it, the transfer and implementation costs were perceived 
as manageable.  
On the other hand, decision criteria for investing in an organizational innovation were not 
discussed in the selected theoretical literature. However, based on the empirical findings in 
Paper II, the assumption that there is a lack of more traditional calculation models for 
investments in organizational innovations seemed correct. The decision to invest71 was instead 
influenced by a number of triggers during the different steps in the diffusion process72. For 
example, desirability was influenced by perceived crises, fads, market demands, national 
bridging institutions and user networks, while perceived feasibility73 was influenced by e.g. 
user networks at a low organizational distance (e.g. Toyota’s influence on Scania), previously 
adopted organizational innovations, the CEO’s previous experience and national bridging 
institutions. The final decision to test and later implement the innovation was then based more 
or less on the CEO’s belief in the benefits of the organizational innovation. This belief had to 
be sustained in order to sustain the innovation. In all three papers, the top management’s 
belief was sustained over time, but theoretically this belief could also have been negatively 
affected by the same triggers as those that created the desire and feasibility for the innovation, 
or by unreasonably large internal inertia. Finally, the importance of top management 
involvement and visible support in order to implement organizational innovations is of greater 
                                                 
69The importance of “homophilous” elements (Rogers, 1995) for the diffusion of organizational innovations 
could be assumed to be valid also for organizational innovations, but was not tested in any of the papers. 
70Referring to the different phases in the diffusion model used in Paper II. 
71Referring to the cases in Paper II and Paper III and their decision to invest in major organizational innovations. 
72Referring to the diffusion model used in Paper II. 
73As has been described earlier this phase was characterized by, a conscious and systematic search and learning 
process, on both a national and an international level. 
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magnitude than for technical innovations. In the case of organizational innovations, where a 
major organizational change takes years to implement and affects a large number of people 
within the organization, top management commitment was empirically identified to be crucial 
(Papers II and III). Top management commitment was not enough, though. The need for a 
more long-term view could instead be thought to go beyond the time an average CEO stays at 
the helm. This observation pointed to the importance of including owners and boards, which 
was a finding that has not been emphasized in earlier research.  
5.1.2 Sustaining organizational innovations  
According to the literature review on sustaining organizational change conducted by 
Buchanan et al. (2005), a portfolio of different factors was identified as influencers on the 
sustainability of organizational innovations. These factors were categorized into four sets, but 
could logically belong to only three – namely the external context (set 1), the internal 
context (Buchanan et al. (2005) set 2 & 4), and the innovation and its change process and 
timing (set 3). What is then clear is that the identified sets of factors are almost the same as 
those influencing the creation and diffusion of organizational innovation. Further, it was 
established that the concept ‘sustainability’ could refer to an improvement trajectory, rather 
than to a particular organizational innovation in order to provide a more dynamic perspective 
on the concept. This made sense, as organizational innovations are constantly re-invented, 
even while being ‘sustained’. The consequence would be that an organizational innovation 
such as ‘TQM’ develops over time in the form of several “releases” along a trajectory. Each 
new release is affected by inertia and internal path-dependency, so that new sub-
organizational innovations complement and support initially implemented organizational 
innovations, rather than challenging and supplementing them. For this reason, the 
organizational innovation at a specific time, X, will probably look different at another time, 
X+10 years. At certain points in time, influenced by external and internal changes, it could be 
assumed that a given trajectory is partly (or totally) broken and therefore partly/fully 
exchanged with a trajectory with a new goal and therefore direction, e.g. if a firm changes 
focus from cost-cutting to innovations or needs to react to a discontinuous technological 
change. 
The ‘creation’, ‘diffusion’, and ‘sustainability’ of an organizational innovation can therefore 
be viewed as three concepts that are intertwined. The separation of the three phases is 
therefore of more theoretical than practical value.  
Interestingly, the selected research in the theoretical framework on sustainability of 
organizational innovations has not considered the role of a board. In fact, very little is written 
overall about boards’ roles in the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational 
innovations. The empirical finding in Paper III, however, was that boards could affect the 
sustainability of major organizational innovations. Findings in Paper III indicated that boards 
could have a very important role to play in the creation, diffusion and sustainability of 
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organizational innovations74. In Paper III, a number of board responsibilities were identified. 
First, the board needs to have insight into how its chosen roles affect a firm’s innovativeness. 
Second, a board is an organizational body that could provide critical resources to the firm. As 
a consequence, a board must proactively gather knowledge about the firm and its industry. 
The board also needs to create an effective board group and work processes, based on norms 
that support a strategic, collaborative, innovative and open environment within the board and 
between the board and the CEO. Finally, a board needs to take the responsibility to create a 
process ensuring long-term success of major organizational innovations in the replacement of 
CEOs. These board responsibilities in turn demand a slightly changed mental model, among 
board members, for how a board best can provide long-term value to a firm. However, a 
board’s mental model of its own mission and main responsibilities is affected by the 
underlying theory on how to best govern a firm. It was assumed that a board’s commitment in 
sustaining an organizational innovation would be negatively affected by the now dominant 
theory, the Principal-Agency theory. However, as a result of increased emphasis on more 
active and involved boards (Hillman et al. 2008), in addition to the development of new 
alternative or supplementary theories such as the Stewardship and Resource Dependence 
theories, boards can be expected to be more involved in the diffusion of major organizational 
innovations in the future.  
5.1.3 A conceptualization of the creation, diffusion and 
sustainability of organizational innovations  
To sum up, the creation and diffusion of organizational innovations were argued to be two 
highly intertwined concepts. However, due to the assumption that the innovation continues to 
change also while being ‘sustained’, all three concepts are intertwined and should not be 
explored in isolation. 
Therefore, in order to study the creation, diffusion and sustainability of an organizational 
innovation, a conceptual model including five steps75, which in turn are influenced by three 
sets of factors, could be useful. The five steps are: Desirability, Feasibility, First-Trial, 
Implementation and Sustainability, and the three sets of influencing factors are the external 
                                                 
74A board’s potential impact on the diffusion of organizational innovations might be quite obvious in the light of 
the importance of interpersonal contacts and individuals’ networks. The board with its board members could be 
assumed to be an important center for interpersonal networks that could be used in searching and evaluating 
ideas and innovations and in getting advice, resources and facilitation in the trial and implementation of an 
organizational innovation. 
75The five steps are based on the model in Paper II, the exploration of the work of Birkinshaw et al. (2008) and 
the work of Paper III. The step “theorizing and labeling” in the model of Birkinshaw et al. (2008) needs to be 
further explored and is not included as a step in the conceptual model developed in this “kappa”. Instead the 
translation, packaging/description, and labeling of the organizational innovation are included in the term 
“standardization” of the organizational innovation. Further work on translating a major organizational innovation 
in the inter-firm diffusion process has been done by other scholars such as Book et al. (2006), and could 
potentially be of value for a future framework. In addition, none of Paper II, Paper III or Birkinshaw et al. (2008) 
included a step for “unlearning” organizational innovations, which might be a sixth step in a future framework. 
  
context and diffusion channels, the internal context
itself. The role of a board was 
innovations. A board thus acts as both a diffusion channel and an important trigger for the 
creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations. 
To draw the conceptual model as a static 
since the creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations are not linear 
concepts77 but highly intertwined, 
reason, it is therefore necessary to add a dynamic perspective to the model. Belo
conceptual model is presented.
Figure 3. A conceptual model for the creation, diffusion and sustainabil
organizational innovations 
 
                                                 
76In addition to these sets of factors, there might be a need to add a set including factors such as the design of the 
search and learning processes and programs/processes for first
highlighted as important by both Birkinshaw and Mol (2006) and Buchanan et al. (2005). The design of the 
search and learning processes, as well as the processes for first
organizational innovation, could therefore be an important part of the diffusion process and a potential subject 
for future research. 
77Also Birkinshaw et al. (2008) found that the concepts were not linear. Related could be the finding by Phelps et 
al. (2007) that the assumptions behind the life
sequential) have been argued not to be true for organizations
followed by periods of crisis and that each crisis meant th
in turn required most probably both a capability of being creative and a desirability of new, or partly new, 
diffused organizational ideas. 
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The model includes five steps: ‘Desirability’, ‘Feasibility’, ‘First-Trial’, ‘Implementation’ and 
‘Sustainability’. However, since the organizational innovation is constantly re-invented and 
therefore re-standardized (visualized as a red fluffy cloud in the middle), specifically in the 
initial first-trial and implementation as well as in the step ‘sustainability’ (e.g. by 
complementary, substituting, or competing innovations), the five steps are not linear but have 
been visualized as a circle. Here it should be noted that the re-invention of the innovation is 
path-dependent and cumulative due to internal inertia among top managers and employees, so 
the circular model is affected by the historically chosen organizational innovations, which fits 
well with the findings of Kimberly (1979). In cases where a follow-up innovation is 
substituting for or even competing with an implemented organizational innovation, it could be 
a question of either new knowledge about how to better reach improvements along a current 
improvement trajectory or the start of a totally new improvement trajectory. The concept 
‘sustainability’ is therefore not referring to a particular organizational innovation but to an 
improvement trajectory (Buchanan et al. 2005). This improvement trajectory is as well 
influenced by the firm’s inertia and path-dependency, and therefore affects the search and 
learning processes for future organizational innovations.  
 
The pink area in the visualized model represents the internal context in a firm. Here the top 
management, as well as the board, is crucial for sustaining an improvement trajectory and 
therefore for making the five-step process run smoothly. Top management’s own inertia, user 
competence and commitment to the innovation and the improvement trajectory are also 
important in order to limit the internal inertia and resistance towards change. Here top 
management could use communication, e.g. in the form of narratives as a tool, limiting 
internal inertia and resistance. Further, the search and learning processes are cumulative and 
path-dependent but could break potential inertia by becoming more conscious and systematic 
in the “Desirability” and “Feasibility” steps. Bridging institutions and user networks could 
here play an important role to “show” and “prove” what is desirable and feasible. The 
‘triggers’78 for the five-step process (visualized as flashes) could be valid for one or several 
steps. Examples of triggers are: a perceived crisis, a new market or owner demand, imitation 
of other companies in e.g. a user network, knowledge transfer from consultants, 
standardization work done by e.g. bridging institutions, clear internal support for the 
innovation and/or visible benefits of the innovation, and previous experience of the 
innovation. An example of a trigger that influences several steps is ‘imitation’. It could be a 
trigger for “Desirability”, “Feasibility”, and potentially even “First-trial”. An example of a 
trigger that was found more related to one step was consultants, who were commonly 
involved in the step “First-Trial” but not so much in earlier or later steps79.  
                                                 
78
 This could be viewed as a decision criterion. 
79
 Interestingly, Scania AB trained external consultants in order to give them the right knowledge and tools 
necessary for conducting a first trial of “Scania Production System”. 
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The blue areas represent the external context. The darker blue area represents the external 
environment in the form of institutional set-up, local norms and history, and existing weak 
ties that the organization has through its employees with networks active outside the local 
context. The light blue area represents the diffusion channels such as movement of people; 
user networks; bridging institutions; consultants; and boards. 
5.2 How do the characteristics of an organizational 
innovation affect the applicability of the 
conceptualization? (RQ2) 
The conceptual model for how organizational innovations are created, diffused and sustained, 
discussed above, is mainly a result of an investigation of the creation, diffusion and 
sustainability of the major organizational innovations ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’ and ‘Lean’. All three 
innovations were mainly developed in the automobile industry, are well standardized, and are 
well known for their focus on quality and operational efficiency. The question is therefore 
how well the conceptual model is applicable for organizational innovations characterized by 
slightly different characteristics. 
In order to use the case in Paper IV for testing the conceptual model developed in previous 
sections, three sub-questions need to be asked and answered. First, is ‘Google’ unique or 
created through a diffusion process of existing ideas (as we claimed in the section ‘Creation of 
organizational innovations’)? One way to find this out is to compare ‘Google’ with some 
relevant research on organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in Internet 
Service- related industries, such as: information services, semiconductors, and 
telecommunication services. Second, do the key characteristics of ‘Google’ differ from those 
of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’? Third, is the conceptual model valid also for the organizational 
innovation ‘Google’ in the case where the key characteristics of ‘Google’ are different from 
those of the other innovations? 
In the next section, we will start by discussing the key characteristics of ‘Google’ and whether 
other researchers who have explored related industries identified these characteristics. We 
will also discuss whether these key characteristics of ‘Google’ are sufficiently different from 
those of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. Finally, in the second section, we will discuss the applicability 
of the conceptual model to the major organizational innovation ‘Google’. 
5.2.1 The uniqueness of ‘Google’ and the difference from ‘TQM’/ 
‘TPS’/‘Lean’ 
The empirical findings in Paper IV indicated that Google has a quite complex organization 
that can be described as a dynamic and open corporate system for continuous innovation. 
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Below, the main characteristics of this organizational innovation will be discussed with 
support from research findings on continuous innovation in related80 industries. 
First, the organization strove to build a capability to change and renew itself constantly 
according to changes in the external environment, as a result of new opportunities and/or as a 
result of internal demand from the employees. The capability to change constantly was 
supported by senior leaders’ mindset, a change-prone culture, semi-structured organization, 
and the use of heuristic rules instead of formal processes, which together allowed a high 
degree of flexibility. Further, in order to adapt quickly and wisely, decision-making was 
pushed down to the leaders with most up-to-date relevant knowledge and experience about the 
issues behind the necessary change. The same was valid for strategies that were built from the 
bottom up. The way senior leaders emphasized the strategic importance of change, and the 
way the whole organization was designed in order to handle constant changes, could imply 
that Google strove for having dynamic capabilities as described by Teece and Pisano (1994). 
As the senior management seemed to be aware of the need for constant change already from 
the start, Google’s dynamic capabilities might also have been a result of learned and 
collective activities (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Further, Google’s choice to have a change-prone 
culture, a semi-structured organization, and heuristic key rules instead of many formal 
processes, and finally to push down decisions to leaders who have the most up-to-date 
knowledge, have been identified by Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 1998) as characteristics of 
organizations that are able to renew themselves constantly in rapidly changing industries. 
However, the prominent position of culture in the case of Google was not reflected either in 
the work of Brown and Eisenhardt (1997, 1998) or in the majority of other studies explored in 
Paper IV81. The only exception was Tushman & O’Reilly III (1997) who claimed: “Managing 
culture is the most neglected, and highest leverage tool for promoting innovation and change” 
and provided both tools for analyzing culture and approaches for shaping innovation cultures. 
Second, the employees were viewed, together with customers, as the most important asset of 
the firm. The focus was on attracting and selecting the right individuals, who had high social 
and cognitive capability as well as an entrepreneurial mind, and who shared the values of the 
firm. The organization was then designed around the individuals in order to facilitate and 
reward them in their work of making innovations in parallel with operational excellence. The 
organization allowed individuality, diversity, openness/transparency, small teams and 
flexibility, but also required employees to be able to self-organize and to be innovators. In this 
way each employee could maximize his/her value to the firm. As a result of the emphasis on 
employees and their capacity, the HR department took on a more strategic role. The 
                                                 
80These were defined in the theoretical framework of this “kappa” as industries producing mainly software with 
relatively short development cycles (< 6-12 months) and market life cycles (< 6-12 months). 
 
81Studies explored in Paper IV were e.g.: Leonard-Barton (1992); Tidd et al. (1997); Teece et al. (1997); 
Tushman & O’Reilly III (1997); Brown & Eisenhardt (1997, 1998); Eisenhardt & Martin (2000); Zollo & Winter 
(2002); Teece (2007); O’Connor (2008); Garud et al. (2011); Lawson & Samson (2001); Matzler et al. (2010). 
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individuals in the case of Google, together with the culture, were perceived internally as being 
the primary drivers of innovation. This primary position of individuals, like that of culture, 
was not found in either the majority of selected research used in Paper IV, or the research 
literature in the theoretical framework of this “kappa”. One exception in Paper IV was again 
Tushman & O’Reilly (1997) who, in the context of shaping organizational culture and 
building a comprehensive system for social control, outline a system of rigorous selection and 
intensive socialization of people. However, there are other researchers who have emphasized 
the need for an increasing focus on and investment in employees. For example, Hamel 
(2009)82 identified the need for investing in and caring about entrepreneurial genius (people 
management)83 as one of the three main management challenges for the future. Another 
instance is Tidd & Bessant (2009) 84, who claim that there is a strong correlation between 
people management and business performance and that the relationship is positive and 
cumulative. The authors argued that in a knowledge economy, people are the most important 
asset and the management challenge is how to go about building the kind of organization in 
which such innovative behavior can flourish: “The most innovative companies are organized 
like a river, with a clear path that flows much faster than one full of obstacles and tributaries. 
They have simple and focused structures and processes (that can be broken) that are there to 
free people, not to get in the way” (Tidd & Bessant, 2009, p. 135).  Further, they emphasized 
the importance of all employees being potential innovators, the importance of self-
organization of employees and the role of diversity in a firm. 
Third, the emphasis on and trust in employees and their capacity demanded a certain 
leadership style. The leaders’ main tasks at Google were to be good coaches and empower 
their employees, to be good ambassadors for the firm, communicate vision/mission, goals and 
                                                 
82The findings in Hamel (2009) were identified as a result of a 2-day conference in California, debating the 
future of management. The conference included a diverse mix of e.g. well-known academics (Eric Abrahamson, 
Chris Argyris, Yves Doz, Linda Hill, Tom Malone, Andrew McAfee, Henry Mintzberg, Jeffrey Pfeffer, C.K. 
Prahalad, Peter Senge, Hal Varian, Steven Weber, Shoshana Zuboff) and representatives from three companies 
(UBS, Google, Whole Food). They found a number of “needed” characteristics of “the future organization”. First 
there is a shared vision that will emotionally affect the employees and thereby direct their focus. Second, leaders 
become “social architects, constitution writers, and entrepreneurs…the leader’s job is to create an environment 
where every employee has the chance to collaborate, innovate and excel”. In addition, leaders trust their 
employees, extend the scope of employee autonomy and are strongly committed to constant innovation and 
change in parallel with securing operational excellence. Third, the degree of formal hierarchy in a firm is limited 
and the firm enables employee diversity, flexibility and self-organization, the formation of smaller organizational 
units and “communities of passion”. Fourth, the responsibility of setting goals is distributed to the employees 
who have the best knowledge and insight. Further, decision-making is based on facts and not on positional 
biases. Fifth, the systems for promotion and follow-up on performance consider and reward both short-term and 
long-term performance and rely more on peer review than top-down control and supervision. Finally, 
management has the mindset and tools for an open organization, building and shaping value-creating networks 
and ecosystems and information systems that create a democracy of information, which in turn stimulate the 
employees to work for the best of the firm.  
83Interesting to notice is that the 2011/2012 definition of TQM in MBNQA has been adjusted, compared with the 
version existing in 1994, and today also emphasizes issues such as agility, management for innovation, and 
valuing workforce members. 
84Tidd and Bessant (2009) is a textbook where the authors have had the ambition to integrate their own and 
others’ research findings into a comprehensive view of innovation management 
 65 
 
priorities for their team and then facilitate their team members to reach goals and priorities, 
but also for removing obstacles for innovation. The leaders’ responsibility was to balance the 
tension between innovations and operational excellence. The selected research in Paper IV 
emphasized the role of leadership in managing change and innovations (e.g. (O’Connor 2008, 
Tushman et al. 2010, Matzler et al. 2010). However, the focus Google put on sustaining the 
culture by investing in development and training of current and potential leaders has not 
received the same attention in either the selected research in Paper IV, or the selected research 
in the chapter ‘Theoretical framework’ in this “kappa”. Nevertheless, according to Hamel 
(2009) a new leadership is necessary in the future due to a higher pace of change, higher 
demands on innovation and higher dependence on employees and their contributions to the 
firm. His exploration of this “future leadership” matches well with the leadership that today is 
required at Google and the leadership Google wants to sustain by educating and training 
current and potential leaders.  
Fourth, the organization aims at managing both innovations and operational excellence. This 
was, as mentioned, part of the leaders’ roles but needed more support than that. The balance 
between the two focus areas started at the top with the board and the top management (e.g. the 
70-20-10% rule) and was then an integrated part of the culture, structure (e.g. the 20% time) 
and performance & incentive systems. In addition, top managers expected, challenged and 
inspired employees to think “big”. Finally, the allowance of subcultures seemed to make 
innovation possible in parallel with operational excellence. For example, by allowing 
engineering and sales to have different time horizons, engineering could focus on more long-
term issues, while sales focused on short-term issues. The focus on “thinking big” in parallel 
with requiring operational excellence indicated that Google aimed for developing and 
sustaining an ambidextrous organization in which activities for both processes are performed 
side by side in the organization. Potentially this could support the findings from Grove 
(1996), Markides (1998), Burgelman (2002), Magnusson & Martini (2008), and Lawson & 
Samson (2001). 
Fifth, Google was an “open system” and a process of acquiring externally developed technical 
innovations, together with co-operation with leading universities/researchers, and investing in 
external technologies through an own venture capital business, supported the internal process 
for more radical technical innovations. While Google did not have any traditional R&D 
function, the leads on what to search for came primarily from top management (mostly the 
founders), product managers, and/or from external sources. The organizational units 
‘Corporate Development’, ‘Google Venture’ and ‘University Relations’ at Google were then 
responsible for the active search, cooperation, investment, and/or acquisition of externally 
developed technologies. However, Google also developed specific products such as platforms 
and application interfaces (APIs) in order for external developers to build products and 
services on Google’s platforms and APIs. Finally, Google cooperated with larger clients and 
suppliers in order to improve existing or future planned products. Technical ideas were also 
transferred through specific forums and tech talks where knowledge was exchanged between 
external and internal technical experts, and from lead customers and suppliers to internal 
resources. Google could therefore be viewed as applying the philosophy behind “open 
innovation” (Chesbrough, 2003). Chesbrough also emphasized the possibilities that firms 
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have with licensing out patents and IP rights. This might be relevant also for Google in the 
future, partly as a result of the acquisition of Motorola and other companies, and partly as a 
result of its own internally developed patents.  
However, in the case of organizational innovations, the organization was adapted as a result 
of top management requirements, customer feedback, the yearly employee survey, and data 
collected in specific internal projects by HR85. In this case the organization could be 
speculated to be less open at the time of the study, since primarily internal sources were used 
for triggering organizational changes. But this was not the situation during the first years of 
the development of Google, when the company adopted several externally developed 
organizational innovations and did not systematically collect data from its own organization. 
It could therefore be speculated whether “openness” in regard to organizational innovations 
might be more dependent on the organization’s specific phase in its lifecycle, compared to 
technical innovations. This makes sense if the development of ‘Google’ is viewed in the form 
of a trajectory instead of as one specific and quite static organizational innovation. The 
innovation ‘Google’ 2010 could therefore be viewed as a result of an improvement trajectory, 
which would mean that ‘Google’ has existed in several “releases”. In the early days when the 
initial release was created, the founders seemed to have a big impact on the design. Yet as the 
organization grew and the next release(s) was/were developed, there seemed to have been an 
increased desire86 to learn from other successful and innovative companies such as 3M and 
P&G. Around 2004, the company invested in the HR department’s (People Operation) 
analytical power, with the aim to consistently analyze and improve the organization in order 
to reach overall goals, including motivated and innovative people. At the same time, the 
organization had recruited many highly talented people (more than 800 employees: Google 
home page January 2012). At this time, it could therefore be speculated that the organization 
started to become more introverted and potentially also a victim of inertia. It may also be 
realistic to believe that if the company encounters a future situation where big internal 
changes are needed, the desire to learn from companies outside might once again increase. 
To sum up, Google has consciously or unconsciously striven for building a capability to 
change and renew itself constantly as a response to external changes, as a result of new 
opportunities, and/or due to internal demand from the employees. This capability could be 
viewed as “…dynamic capabilities” referred to by Teece and Pisano (1994)87. Further, 
Google’s semi-structured organization, minimal number of formal processes, use of heuristic 
rules, and push-down of strategy development and decision-making to people with the most 
relevant and real-time knowledge, are all well reflected in the work of Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997, 1998). In addition, Google is human-centric and has built its organization in a way that 
will promote employees’ creativity and performance, in a way similar to that described by 
                                                 
85Google regularly performed internal studies of employees. An example is a study of the relationship between 
employees’ personality and historical background/experience and their performance in the firm. By using this 
data, Google could adjust and improve its organization. 
86This desire seems in turn to have been affected by the board at this time. 
87For example by moving into the Mobile, Social network, Display, and TV businesses, all of which were a 
result of new market trends and required a re-location of internal resources. 
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Tidd and Bessant (2009) and Hamel (2009). Google also manages the tension between 
innovations and operational excellence in one and the same organization, a strategy that was 
found important by e.g. Lawson and Samson (2001) and Stacy (1992). Finally, the 
organization was open, and more so in regard to technical innovations than for organizational 
innovations, which seemed to be based more on necessity and internal resources. Google 
could therefore be called open in the world of Chesbrough (2003). Two things did, however, 
differ between the findings at Google and those of other selected research in the chapter 
“Theory framework”: the integration Google seemed to have done of previous research 
findings into one corporate system for continuous innovation and the prominent positions of 
both culture and individuals for innovation. In the case of Google, culture and individuals 
were perceived as the main drivers of innovation, a status that none of the other selected 
researchers emphasized. Finally, due to the similarity between the characteristics found in 
research literature on related industries and the characteristics found at Google, the major 
organizational innovation ‘Google’ could only be viewed as unique in the integration of its 
own and others’ ideas (though perhaps thought-leading ideas).  
Hence, are the key characteristics of Google different from those describing 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’? 
The answer is both yes and no. The emphasis on constant renewal of the organization and the 
need to manage continuous innovation were not as explicit in the organizational innovations 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ as in ‘Google’. This has as a consequence that ‘Google’ is avoiding 
“process orientation” and “standardization”, emphasized in the three other major innovations, 
and instead embraces a semi-structured organization with as few formal processes as possible. 
Regarding the focus on employees, empowerment and a leadership that coaches employees 
rather than dictating what they must do are two characteristics that are partly covered in 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, but the levels of empowerment and self-organization of employees 
seem to be even higher in the case of ‘Google’. Finally, openness is partly covered in 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. However, openness in these three organizational innovations from the 
1990s and early 2000s primarily meant openness towards customers and suppliers, not 
exploring possibilities in the whole ecosystem88 of which the firm was part. 
In summary, the characteristics of ‘Google’ are by us viewed as different “enough” to be used 
in testing the applicability of the conceptual model developed previously in this chapter. 
5.2.2 The applicability of the conceptualization 
As was said above, the conceptual model for organizational innovations is based on findings 
from studies of major organizational innovations mainly developed within the automobile 
industry. Further, those innovations have been well described in numerous books and articles, 
and have been the object of standardization on international, national, and firm levels. In 
comparison, the major organizational innovation developed and sustained at Google has been 
                                                 
88However, “Total approach” in Alänge (1994) could be viewed as a kind of early “ecosystem approach” since 
the firm’s responsibility for external partners and environment was included. 
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developed within the rapidly changing Internet Service industry and has so far not been 
standardized, even though some journalists and researchers have written about the company. 
It was, however, found that many of the organizational characteristics present at Google had 
been identified by selected research on Internet Service- related industries such as 
semiconductors, information services, and telecommunication services. This could mean two 
things. First, the major organizational innovation ‘Google’ is a combination of existing and 
firm-specific organizational ideas. The assumption that organizational innovations are most 
commonly not developed in local, isolated processes (mentioned in the section “Creation of 
organizational innovations” above) seems therefore correct. Second, the characteristics of 
‘Google’ are not firm- specific and specific to the Internet Service industry, but actually 
relevant and valid for other firms active in other rapidly changing industries as well.  
In order to discuss the applicability of the conceptual model, we will first discuss the common 
factors and then the differences between the two cases (‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’ on one side and 
‘Google’ on the other) of major organizational innovations and how this could affect the 
conceptualization discussed above. The test of the conceptual model is in the form of the 
analysis below. 
Let us start with a discussion of some common factors between the case of 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ and the case of ‘Google’. First, both cases have been affected by the 
external context. In both cases the institutional set-up has played a role in the first two steps 
“Desirability” and “Feasibility”. In the case of ‘TQM’/‘TPS/‘Lean’, bridging institutions on 
both the international and national levels influenced the degree of desirability and feasibility 
by standardizing the innovation, and by inspiring, educating and encouraging the innovation 
in local firms and organizations. In the case of ‘Google’, the institutional set-up in Silicon 
Valley seemed to influence the firm by e.g. its local norms on how to organize, as well as by 
having access to knowledge via local universities such as Stanford and Berkeley and to capital 
via a knowledgeable VC industry. Desirability and feasibility of the innovation, in the case of 
‘TQM’/‘TPS/‘Lean’, were also affected by user networks and by an international and national 
fad of total quality, and by market demands on ISO 9000 certification. In the case of Google, 
the founders were driven primarily by perceived global opportunities facilitated by the 
development of Internet. However, they were also driven by an ambition to develop a 
dynamic ‘innovation engine’ – a goal that could be speculated to be more common in Silicon 
Valley than in many other places in the world – but also issues that were discussed by other 
firms such as 3M and by researchers in the Valley in early 2000 (e.g. firms’ capabilities to 
renew themselves by Brown & Eisenhardt (1997, 1998), and the need to speed up the degree 
of innovativeness through “Open Innovation” by Chesbrough (2003)).  Today, one may 
wonder whether there is a strong fad of innovation, which would increase the desirability and 
feasibility of innovation-oriented organizational innovations (Abrahamson, 1996).  
Second, a traditional market for organizational innovations such as: ‘TQM’/‘TPS/‘Lean’ or 
for ‘Google’, has been non-existent. In regard to diffusion channels substituting for a 
traditional market, there seem to be a high similarity between the cases. In both cases external 
ideas came primarily via top management movement and the board. Interesting to notice, 
however, is that the founders at Google during the first years preferred employees who did not 
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have any long track record in the business sector; hence relatively few ideas based on real 
business experience could have come from this group. The reason was that the founders 
wanted to build an organization that was free from what they perceived as bad behavior that 
existed in the business sector at this time. Instead they valued their own ideas as more feasible 
in order to build the organization they desired. In 1999/early 2000, the founders’ negative 
perception of business experience started to change, and the recruitment of board members 
such as John Doerr and Eric Schmidt (later the CEO) contributed new organizational ideas. In 
addition to movement of senior people and the use of board members’ experience and 
networks, all our cases used highly experienced experts/consultants when developing the 
organization and/or doing a first trial. In the case of Google, the top management team in mid-
2000 regularly used the support of  “The Coach” (Bill Campbell) in creating a good 
management team and in building an organization that could accomplish both innovation and 
operational excellence. In the case of ‘TQM’/‘TPS/‘Lean’, experienced experts/consultants 
were in several cases used in the step “First-Trial”. Further, as was discussed above, the local 
institutional set-up played a role as a source of norms, ideas, and/or resources.   
Third, in regard to internal context, the final decision criteria used in both cases seemed to 
have been a strong belief in the benefits of the organizational innovation. In the cases in Paper 
II and Paper III, the top management teams in the adopting firms were convinced of the 
benefits of ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, or ‘Lean’. In some cases the belief was there from the very start 
and did not need a step of “Desirability” to be developed (e.g. the case of Mölndal Hospital), 
while in other cases external information and education together with imitation created a 
desire and a sense of feasibility and therefore a belief in the innovation (e.g. the case of 
Electrolux89). In the case of Google, the founders’ belief in how to best design an organization 
for innovation was there from the start. The two founders were convinced that in order to 
foster innovation they had to invest in a strong innovation-oriented culture, in the right 
people, and in a structure that was flat, open and transparent and allowed a lot of 
communication between employees. Traditional calculation models were not used in these 
decisions. Interesting, though, is that Google over time has become very data-driven also in 
their HR decisions. Google, therefore, since 2004 has based its decisions for re-invention of 
the organization on data collected through internal projects on employees’ attitudes and 
behavior. Google’s request for data underlying an organizational change could be viewed as 
some kind of “calculation model”. In order to be able to conduct these studies and analyses in 
a more correct way, experienced Ph.D.s in organizational development were hired in 2004 
and later. In addition, top management involvement was crucial for the first trial, 
implementation and sustainability of both ‘TQM’/‘TPS/‘Lean’ and ‘Google’. In both cases, 
top management was clearly committed to the change(s). In the case of Google, top 
management was not only committed but the primary driver of change. Top managers in this 
case were the main creators of the organization. However, the board also played an important 
role in both cases. For example, in Paper III the boards in two of the cases were actively 
involved in the diffusion and sustainability of ‘TQM’ and ‘Lean’ respectively. This was 
                                                 
89In the case of Scania AB the top leadership had access to numbers showing a potential of more than doubling 
productivity. These numbers came from a comparison between Toyota and a Swedish car manufacturing plant. 
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achieved by providing top management ideas, training and resources in the areas of ‘TQM’ 
and ‘Lean’. In the case in Paper IV, the board played an important role in steps such as 
“Desirability”, “Feasibility” and “Implementation” by contributing ideas and support in 
implementation, e.g. of 20% time and of the OKR system. In addition, the consistency of 
board members over time might mean that the board also played an important role in the step 
“Sustainability”. Still, a board can also hinder the creation, diffusion and sustainability of an 
organizational innovation by not sharing the vision of top management, by not understanding 
the organizational innovations and the benefits of it, and by not making sure the innovation is 
sustained in the case of a change of CEO.  
Finally, the need to look at organizational innovations and their creation, diffusion, and 
sustainability in a dynamic and wider context was found in Paper II, Paper III, and Paper IV. 
Both ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ and ‘Google’ were continuously re-invented, which was partly 
path-dependent as it was based on previously developed or adopted and implemented ideas. 
Further, both cases of innovation affect every part of an organization and could therefore be 
viewed as major organizational innovations affecting several subsystems, such as the social, 
technical, cultural and political subsystems. 
We have now discussed a number of similarities between the two cases ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ 
and ‘Google’. However, there are also a number of differences between the two cases that will 
now be discussed in order to further test the conceptual model.  
The differences are found primarily in regard to the innovation itself and to factors in the 
internal context that are affected by Google’s different nature. If we start with discussing 
differences in the innovations, it is clear that all three innovations are tacit and more or less 
corporate-wide by nature. They are also a result of several minor organizational innovations 
that together form the comprehensive organizational innovations, which are in focus here. For 
these reasons, they were all labeled major organizational innovations and thus contribute to 
long-term competitive advantages (Hamel, 2006). Yet there is a big difference between 
‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ on one side and ‘Google’ on the other. ‘Google’ is by nature even more 
tacit. The reason is that in order to encourage and sustain dynamic capabilities as well as 
ambidexterity and a human-centric organization, the organization has been designed as flat 
and semi-structured, where the number of formal processes and policies is minimized, and 
where empowerment and self-organization are encouraged90. In fact, Google does not even 
have an organizational chart to show to its employees or external people. There is thus no 
blueprint of the organization. For this reason, the imitation and therefore diffusion of such 
innovation have to be conducted primarily through the movement of people who have deep 
knowledge of the organization. In addition to an increased level of tacitness, there does not 
exist any dominating design today for this kind of organizational innovation, i.e. an 
                                                 
90These characteristics are today partly covered in the 2011/2012 version of TQM, but were not emphasized in 
the 1990s version of TQM or the 2000s version of TPS and Lean Production, which were studied in Paper II and 
Paper III. The fact that the 2011/2012 version of TQM includes parts of these characteristics could mean that 
these organizational characteristics might be required also in industries that today are known to be less dynamic 
than the industries related to the Internet Service industry. 
 71 
 
organizational model fulfilling key organizational characteristics for continuous innovation in 
rapidly changing industries. No standardization of this kind of innovation has been created 
either by international or national bridging organizations or by consultants or firms. Some of 
the pieces start to come together, but a dominant design is still not there (Barsh, 2008, p. 3; 
Tidd & Bessant, 2009, p. 132). As there does not exist any dominant design and 
standardization of such organizational innovation, a number of internal factors are negatively 
affected. First, not only the imitation is hard but also the search and learning processes for 
companies suffer. The desire to become more innovative is present in many firms, but as no 
dominating design exists, the firms’ search and learning processes can become less systematic 
and efficient. At best, sub-components of the innovation are observed, interpreted and 
potentially imitated from different companies, and every adopter then has to build the 
“model” by trial and error of an integration of the different sub-components. The alternative is 
that a consulting company suggests a solution for the firm. The risk of failure is high in both 
cases. In fact, according to Skarzynski & Gibson (2008), two management consultants 
focused on supporting firms in building a higher innovativeness: “…the reason why so few 
organizations have so far succeeded at building a deep, ongoing capacity for innovation is 
that most of them only dipped their toes into the water, initiating piecemeal activities here and 
there and hoping that by throwing some money at these initiatives they would somehow bear 
fruit. They never dived into innovation in a serious and systemic way.”  
Further, as the major organizational innovation is hard to observe and test, the time for 
implementation and the transfer and implementation cost could in this case be expected to 
be higher than in the case where the innovation is standardized in some degree. In addition, as 
‘Google’ is built on certain values, the adopting firms might need to unlearn in a way that is 
not according to the firm’s historical management tradition (inertia) or top managers’ personal 
values, or could threaten their political status (that is, create mental and/or political filters for 
adoption (Jarnehammar, 1995)). Moreover, the semi-structured organization might not be 
feasible in certain industries, e.g. industries developing products that are more capital-
intensive and require many years of development. For these reasons, all firms might not easily 
adopt ‘Google’. Finally, the role of top management and the board could be speculated to be 
of even more importance than in the case of e.g. ‘TQM’. For example, sustaining an 
organizational innovation that constantly needs to balance between chaos and structure, allow 
empowerment and self-organization of employees, and quickly and constantly adapt 
according to external changes, could be assumed to be more challenging than sustaining an 
organization which is built up around a clearly fixed structure and formal processes. Finally, 
due to Google’s tacit nature, the possible degree of standardization of this kind of innovation 
might be lower than in the case of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, which in turn could affect a diffusion 
of ‘Google’. Regarding a “standardization” of ‘Google’, it was clear that Google itself had 
adopted a number of quite well standardized organizational innovations that today are sub-
components of the corporate-wide organizational innovation. Examples of these were the 
OKR system and 20% time. However, ‘Google’ as a corporate-wide organizational innovation 
in itself has not been well standardized and is not even visual in an organizational chart 
(blueprint). In parallel, to our current knowledge, no international or national bridging 
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institute has communicated any standardization work around this kind of innovation91. Today, 
however, there are examples of work done by some researchers and consultants on identifying 
characteristics of highly innovative and fast-paced companies in Internet Service- related 
industries. There has also been work done on standardizing methodologies in the area of e.g. 
“Agile software development”, which among other things promotes adaptive planning and 
rapid and flexible response to change. Therefore, there could be a possibility to standardize 
components of ‘Google’, but potentially also the overall major organizational innovation, 
thereby affecting the diffusion rate of components and the major organizational innovation.  
To sum up, the conceptual model developed in this “kappa” seems useful both for analyzing 
similarities and differences between the two cases: ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ on one side and 
‘Google’ on the other. For example, the influencing factors in the external context such as the 
local institutional set-up, local norms, user networks, and fads were all relevant for the 
diffusion of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’ and ‘Google’. In addition, a traditional market was non-
existent for both cases, so that interpersonal diffusion channels were highly relevant. 
Decisions on how to develop the organizational innovation were mainly based on top 
management or board members’ experience and “beliefs”. Both cases of innovations also 
affect several subsystems within the organization. However, the innovation ‘Google’ is more 
tacit than ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, and not as standardized; thus several factors in the internal 
context such as search and learning processes, inertia, transfer and implementation costs, but 
also costs for sustaining the innovation could be assumed to be negatively affected, which in 
turn could slow down a diffusion of the innovation. Nonetheless, some researchers and 
consultants have done some work on standardizing either organizational components or more 
complete organization-wide solutions, for continuous innovation in fast-changing 
environments. Therefore, a standardization of ‘Google’ as a major organizational innovation 
might be possible, which in turn will positively enhance its diffusion rate (Rogers, 1995).  
                                                 
91MBNQA has however described TQM 2011/2012 with a number of criteria which are identified in research on 
rapidly changing industries, such as Information Services and Telecommunication Services, and which are also 
partly reflected at Google. 
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6 Conclusions  
In the previous chapter, two research questions have been discussed: “How can the creation, 
diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations be understood and conceptualized?” 
(RQ1) and “How do the characteristics of organizational innovations affect the applicability 
of the conceptualization?” (RQ2). As a result of the discussion of RQ1, a conceptual model 
for the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of organizational innovations was visualized as a 
five-step process influenced by three main sets of factors – the characteristics of the 
innovation itself, the internal and the external context together with diffusion channels.  
 
Since the conceptual model was primarily based on empirical findings in Papers I, II and III, 
in which ‘TQM’ was studied in Paper II, and ‘TQM’, ‘TPS’, and ‘Lean’ in Paper III, the 
conceptualization was tested on a partly different major organizational innovation, ‘Google’. 
 
Before we tested the conceptual model, three sub-questions were answered. First we explored 
in what degree ‘Google’ was a unique organizational innovation. The answer was that each 
characteristic of the innovation ‘Google’ was not as unique as might at first have been 
imagined. However, the combination of existing organizational ideas, and the application of 
it, could be viewed as unique. Further, the fact that ‘Google’ well reflected findings from 
other rapidly changing industries supported the assumption in the ‘Discussion’ that 
organizational innovations are primarily created through a combination of existing/new ideas 
rather then through an isolated innovation process. Second, we wanted to understand whether 
‘Google’ was different from ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. The answer was that ‘Google’ was 
sufficiently different to be useful for testing the conceptual model. 
 
The test showed that the conceptual model was valid also for ‘Google’ and was useful in 
identifying both similarities and differences in the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of 
‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’ on one side and ‘Google’ on the other. One observation made in the 
analysis was that ‘Google’ by its very nature is more tacit than ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, why it 
was questioned in what degree this kind of highly tacit organizational innovation is possible 
to standardize. There are, however, examples of standardization work performed by some 
researchers and consultants, so it could be assumed possible to standardize at least some 
components of the innovation. 
 
Below, the main conclusions for each research question will be presented.  
 
6.1 How can the creation, diffusion and sustainability of 
organizational innovations be understood and 
conceptualized? (RQ1) 
A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from the ‘Discussion’ chapter. The main 
conclusions regarding organizational innovations’ creation, diffusion and sustainability are as 
follows. 
Conclusion 1: The creation, diffusion and sustainability of organizational innovations are 
three intertwined concepts rather than three separate and sequential ones. For this reason it 
does not make sense to speak of or study each concept in isolation. 
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Conclusion 2: As an organizational innovation is constantly re-invented, the creation, 
diffusion and sustainability of an organizational innovation are concepts that recur in a non-
sequential pattern and are directed by a firm’s improvement trajectory, regardless of whether 
this was consciously decided by the firm or was mainly a response to external and internal 
demands and pressures. 
Conclusion 3: The concept ‘Sustainability’ of organizational innovations refers to a firm’s 
improvement trajectory, rather than to a particular organizational innovation. A major 
organizational innovation such as ‘TQM’ exists therefore over time in several “releases” in an 
adopting firm. Each release is valid only temporarily, since it is constantly re-invented92 as a 
result of continuous external and internal changes. 
Conclusion 4: The conceptual model for how organizational innovations are created, 
diffused, and sustained can be visualized as five steps in a circular pattern, circling around a 
firm- specific improvement trajectory. The five steps are in turn influenced by three main sets 
of influencing factors: the characteristics of the innovation itself, the internal context, and the 
external context together with diffusion channels. 
Conclusion 5: A board of directors plays important roles as both a diffusion channel and as a 
trigger for all five steps in the process of creation, diffusion and sustainability of major 
organizational innovations. Boards and their roles must therefore be highlighted and included 
in future studies on organizational innovations. 
6.2 How do the characteristics of organizational 
innovations affect the applicability of the 
conceptualization? (RQ2) 
The main conclusions regarding research question 2, “How organizational characteristics of 
organizational innovations affect the applicability of the conceptualization”, are as follows. 
Conclusion 6: The conceptual model, based on studies on ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, is applicable 
also for studying the different major organizational innovation ‘Google’.  
Conclusion 7: The conceptual model was useful in identifying both similarities and 
differences between the creation, diffusion, and sustainability of ‘TQM’/’TPS’/’Lean’ on one 
side and ‘Google’ on the other hand.  
Conclusion 8: The conceptual model proved also useful in identifying issues that could 
negatively affect the creation, diffusion and sustainability of an organizational innovation, e.g. 
‘Google’. The identified issues are: 
                                                 
92Conducted by e.g. the adopting firm. However, the innovation is also re-invented by standardization institutes, 
industry organizations and/or consulting firms on a national or international level. Further, closely related to the 
constant re-invention is a constant re-standardization of the innovation. While the adopting firm most probably 
conducts standardization of specific ways of working, the standardization institutes, industry organizations 
and/or consulting firms, aim for standardizing also company-wide major organizational innovations. 
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• First, the major organizational innovation ‘Google’ is more tacit93 than the previously 
tested innovations ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’, which make it harder to standardize the 
innovation ‘Google’. 
• Second, there is a lack of explicit and well-communicated firm, national and 
international standardization processes94 for this organizational innovation. However, 
some researchers and consultants have done some early work, which could be used for 
future standardization of at least parts of this organizational innovation. 
• Third, internal factors such as the search and learning processes, inertia, transfer and 
implementation costs, as well as costs for sustaining the innovation, are all negatively 
affected due to this organizational innovation’s more tacit nature and due to the 
current lack of standardization processes.  
• Fourth, because of the semi-structured organization and higher focus on self-
organization and empowerment of employees, the role of top management and the 
board can be assumed to play an even more important role for this type of 
organizational innovation than in the case of ‘TQM’/‘TPS’/‘Lean’. 
  
                                                 
93The degree of tacitness is here based on observations such as the degree of semi-structured organization and 
the existence of organizational blueprints and standardizations of the complete innovation or of parts of it, rather 
than on a quantitative measurement along a developed numeric scale. 
94The Internet industry is much younger than the automobile industry. This could be argued to be the reason why 
there are no formal standardization processes for this type of organizational innovation.  
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7  Suggestions for future research  
There is a need to further develop and test the conceptual model for the creation, diffusion and 
sustainability of organizational innovations that has been developed in this “kappa”. One part 
of future work could be to add a concept of “unlearning” an organizational innovation. To 
“unlearn” means that a firm needs to break away from the old way of doing things. This 
capability, according to Alänge et al. (1998), is dependent on the competence of the users and 
their capability to “unlearn”. It would also be of interest to further explore the issue of 
program design, for instance in the search (e.g. more structured and conscious) and 
implementation of an organizational innovation. In addition, the search and learning processes 
overall, the role of formal and informal individuals’ networks both external and internal to the 
firm, and the role of boards in the conceptual model would be of interest to investigate more 
fully. 
The issue of standardizing (including activities such as translation, packaging/description, and 
labeling) the innovation in the creation, diffusion, and sustainability processes also needs to 
be further investigated. In relation to this issue, it would be of interest to investigate in what 
degree (and which components) of ‘Google’ it is possible to standardize, and to explore 
whether standardization is important for increasing the rate of diffusion. For example, while 
the specific organizational characteristics could be thought possible to standardize, the way 
they are implemented in each firm and organization is probably harder to standardize.  
In addition, it would be of value to further explore the specific organizational characteristics 
needed for continuous innovation in rapidly changing industries and whether these 
characteristics are part of an “organizational innovation” needed only for this kind of 
industries or whether they are needed more generally in today’s fast-changing world, e.g. due 
to technology and consumer behavioral changes.  
In addition, it could be of great interest to further explore the usefulness of referring the 
concept ‘Sustainability’ of organizational innovations to an improvement trajectory, rather 
than to a particular organizational innovation. For example, how should an improvement 
trajectory be defined and when does it start and end? Moreover, what happens if two 
improvement trajectories are merged, e.g. if Google is to implement Lean Production? Will 
this mean a totally new improvement trajectory that can result in both operational efficiency 
and innovations in a fast-changing environment, or will it just be a new “release” of ‘Lean’ 
for a specific context, or will it be a totally impossible assignment? 
Finally, the usefulness of the term ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ in regard to organizational 
innovations could be of interest to explore further. This issue could also be relevant to study 
in combination with examining communication and standardization processes for 
organizational innovations, as the intellectual property rights are largely part of the 
communication and translation/packaging/description/labeling of the organizational 
innovation. 
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Suggestions for future research are therefore: 
1. Develop further the conceptual model for studying the creation, diffusion and 
sustainability of organizational innovations.  
a. Explore a potential new step in the conceptual model, labeled ‘Unlearning’. 
b. Explore whether and how to integrate the factor “program design” of e.g. search 
and learning processes, first trial, implementation, sustainability and unlearning. 
c. Further explore the search and learning processes for organizational innovations, 
and specifically the importance of individuals’ networks. 
d. Further explore the roles of boards in the conceptual model for the ‘creation’, 
‘diffusion’, and ‘sustainability’ of organizational innovations. 
2. Explore the importance of a standardization of this kind of very tacit organizational 
innovations, and to what degree it is possible. Further, explore what parts of the 
organizational innovation make sense to standardize. 
3. Further investigate the assumption that there are specific characteristics necessary for 
rapidly changing industries, and whether these characteristics are valid and necessary for 
future firms overall due to changes in technology and society.  
4. Explore the usefulness of referring to an improvement trajectory, rather than to a 
particular organizational innovation when exploring the concept ‘Sustainability’ of 
organizational innovations. In addition, explore the consequences if two organizational 
innovations, previously part of different ‘improvement trajectories’, merge.  
5. Explore the usefulness of the term ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ in regard to organizational 
innovations. Further, explore the importance of standardization and communication in 
order to create and protect a ‘new-to-the-state-of-the-art’ organizational innovation. 
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